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首页> 外文学位 >INDIVIDUALISM AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES (TYLER BURGE, PSYCHOLOGY, PROTOTYPE THEORY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, DAVID MARR).
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INDIVIDUALISM AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES (TYLER BURGE, PSYCHOLOGY, PROTOTYPE THEORY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, DAVID MARR).

机译：个人主义和认知科学（泰勒·伯奇，心理学，原型理论，人工智慧，戴维·马尔）。

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摘要

Is the specific intentional character of a thought entirely fixed by states of the thinker's body and brain? Is it entirely fixed by what he can see of his own thought (embedded in glass, as it were) with his mind's eye? A study of the sciences of thought suggests not.; Individualism, the view that a person's intentional mental states are fixed by his physical, functional, and phenomenal states, is implicit in most modern and contemporary philosophical accounts of the mind, from Descartes to Jerry Fodor. But Putnam, Burge, and others have argued that a person's normal environment has a broadly conceptual bearing on the nature of his thought. If the natural or social surroundings of imagined replicas differ in certain ways, their obliquely specifiable thought contents contents will also differ.; I discuss the claim, made by Stich, Dennett, and Fodor, that if we are to have a science of thought, the states it attributes must supervene on physical states of the subject's body. The burden of the dissertation is that each of several quite respectable cognitive-scientific theories attributes mental states whose non-individualistic character is deeply rooted in the theory's methodology and structure. This is argued in detail with respect to three pieces of work in cognitive psychology: Marr's computational theory of vision, Winograd's artificial intelligence program SHRDLU, and the account (advanced by Rosch, Tversky, and others) of object concepts as structured by similarity to a prototype.; Each theory, I argue, uses intentional language broadly continuous with ordinary mentalistic description, and is therefore prima facie non-individualistic. Moreover, each theory presupposes a substantial conception of the success or failure of mental states, and aims at explaining how this success or failure comes about. This requires typing psychological states by reference to "externally imposed" norms of proper application, hence by reference to the actual natures of things in the world that subjects normally interact with. The argument involves excursions into such questions as whether psychological processes are syntactic, and whether our object concepts have "fuzzy" extensions.
机译：思想的特定意图特征是否完全由思想者的身体和大脑状态决定？是否完全可以由他用自己的眼睛看到的自己的想法（嵌入玻璃中）来固定？对思想科学的研究表明没有。从一个笛卡尔到杰里·福多，个人主义是一个人的意向精神状态是由他的身体，机能和现象状态决定的观点，这种观点隐含在大多数现代和当代的思想哲学解释中。但是，普特南（Putnam），布尔格（Burge）和其他人则认为，一个人的正常环境对他的思想本质具有广泛的概念影响。如果想象中的复制品的自然或社会环境在某些方面有所不同，那么它们倾斜指定的思想内容内容也将有所不同。我将讨论由Stich，Dennett和Fodor提出的主张，即如果我们要拥有一门思想科学，则其所赋予的状态必须超越受试者身体的物理状态。论文的负担在于，几种颇受人尊敬的认知科学理论中的每一种都归因于心理状态，这些心理状态的非个体特征深深扎根于该理论的方法和结构中。这是关于认知心理学的三项工作的详细论述：马尔的视觉计算理论，威诺格拉德的人工智能程序SHRDLU以及对象概念（由Rosch，Tversky等人提出），这些对象概念的构成类似于与原型。;我认为，每种理论都使用有意的语言，这些语言广泛地与普通的心理描述结合在一起，因此，表面上是非个体的。而且，每种理论都以对精神状态成败的实质概念为前提，并旨在解释这种成败是如何产生的。这就要求通过参照“外部施加的”适当适用的规范来键入心理状态，因此要参照受试者通常与之互动的事物的实际性质。该论点涉及到诸如心理过程是否是句法的以及我们的客体概念是否具有“模糊”扩展之类的问题。

著录项

  • 作者

    KOBES, BERNARD WILLIAM.;

  • 作者单位

    University of California, Los Angeles.;

  • 授予单位 University of California, Los Angeles.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.; Artificial Intelligence.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1986
  • 页码 434 p.
  • 总页数 434
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 哲学理论;人工智能理论;
  • 关键词

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