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A differential game model of regional arms race and impact of foreign assistance on arms accumulation.

机译：地区军备竞赛和外国援助对军备积累的影响的差分博弈模型。

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摘要

Although the end of the Cold War has led to the cessation of the global East-West arms race of the era, however, military conflicts or arms buildups at local and regional levels have continued unabated. Well-known examples of regional antagonism include Israel and Arab countries; Pakistan and India; North and South Koreas; Taiwan and China; Greece and Turkey. For many of these regional arms races, the major weapons states have played an important role in fuelling the regional arms buildups through arms export or military/economic assistance. Such military/economic aid could have significant impact on the recipients' defense spending, non-defense consumption and regional arms accumulation.;In this study, a regional arms race problem is modeled as a competitive, resource constrained, dynamic process of interaction between two opposing nations (or coalitions of nations) in their acquisition of weapons. Each strategically interacting nation allocates its resource endowment among nondefense consumption goods and defense activities that determine the current and future levels of weapon stock. Although each nation derives utility from both the non-defense consumption and the security provided by the accumulated weapon stock level, however, by increasing the level of investment in weapons and accumulation of weapon stock to boost up the level of security, less resource will become available for non-defense consumption purposes -- the so called "guns versus butter" dilemma. This dilemma is brought to the fore by an explicit formulation of the budget constraints that also depend on the availability and fungibility of foreign economic or military assistance.;Thus, the game-theoretic approach taken in this study provides a more satisfactory underpinning for the well-known a-theoretical Richardson's arms race equations. Whilst analytical and numerical results under various equilibrium solution concepts are derived and compared, the possibility of payoff values moving nearer to the Pareto-efficient cooperative outcomes (for at least one player) by employing non-linear feedback strategies is also discussed and illustrated by way of numerical method.
机译：尽管冷战的结束导致了该时代全球东西方军备竞赛的停止，但是，地方和地区两级的军事冲突或军备建设仍然没有减弱。区域对抗的著名例子包括以色列和阿拉伯国家。巴基斯坦和印度；朝鲜和韩国；台湾和中国；希腊和土耳其。对于许多这些区域军备竞赛，主要武器国家在通过武器出口或军事/经济援助促进区域军备建设中发挥了重要作用。这种军事/经济援助可能会对受援国的国防开支，非国防消费和区域军备积累产生重大影响。；在本研究中，区域军备竞赛问题被建模为两个国家之间竞争，资源受限，动态相互作用的过程对立国家（或国家联盟）购买武器。每个进行战略互动的国家都会在非国防消费品和国防活动之间分配其资源end赋，这些资源决定了当前和将来的武器库存水平。尽管每个国家都从非国防消费和累积武器储备水平提供的安全性中获得效用，但是，通过增加武器投资水平和武器储备积累以提高安全性，资源将减少可用于非国防消费目的-所谓的“枪与黄油”困境。通过明确制定预算约束条件来解决这一难题，预算约束条件还取决于外国经济或军事援助的可得性和可替代性。因此，本研究采用的博弈论方法为油井提供了更令人满意的基础理查森著名的a理论军备竞赛方程。在推导和比较了各种平衡解概念下的分析和数值结果的同时，还讨论并说明了采用非线性反馈策略使回报值更接近帕累托有效合作成果（至少一名参与者）的可能性。数值方法。

著录项

  • 作者

    Ng, Kwok Leung.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Minnesota.;

  • 授予单位 University of Minnesota.;
  • 学科 Economics General.;Economics Theory.;Military Studies.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2009
  • 页码 105 p.
  • 总页数 105
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 经济学;经济学;
  • 关键词

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