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Game-Theoretic Thinking of State-Imposed Tax and Expenditure Limitations: Rule Design, Institutional Diversity, and Municipal Fiscal Outcomes

机译：国家施加的税收和支出限制的博弈论思考：规则设计，制度多样性和市政财政成果

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摘要

This dissertation aims to explore the question, does the institutional design of state-imposed municipal tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) matter for municipal fiscal outcomes? As tools for controlling the size of government and enhancing efficiency and accountability, TELs have received significant attention since California's Proposition 13. The impacts of TELs, however, remain an open empirical question, particularly at the municipal level. Despite scholars who have attempted to address this issue, three limitations are evident. First, the literature fails to offer relevant theoretical explanations of the role of TELs. Previous studies rely on somewhat insufficient approaches which have drawbacks in developing hypotheses. Second, the TEL literature has focused on measuring certain features of the limitations---e.g., the presence of TELs and their binding nature; they have not fully captured the institutional heterogeneity of municipal TELs, primarily derived from differences in states' selection of TEL arrangements. Third, few studies examine how the impact of TELs is mediated by other institutional factors.;To fill these research gaps, this study investigates the link between the institutional design of TELs and municipal taxing and fiscal behavior. A theoretical framework for this study builds on the game-theoretic approach to institutions, which emphasizes the role of rules design, institutional diversity, and transaction costs in operationalizing and understanding institutions. It motivates me to hypothesize that municipal fiscal outcomes shaped by the collective decision of budget actors may vary depending on the incentive structures that different forms of municipal TELs may generate and the interaction between TELs and other institutional settings. Based on the game-theoretic ideas of institutions, a new way to operationalize municipal TELs, which separate limitations into six different institutional designs, is proposed. The system generalized method of moments, addressing the potential problem of endogeneity, is employed to test the varying impacts of differently-designed municipal TELs and their interactions with state-imposed bond referendum requirements, state-imposed balanced-budget requirements, and municipal form of government. Several fiscal outcome indicators such as property taxes and other revenues, total and categorical expenditures, debt outstanding, and fund reserves are considered as the left-hand-side variables.;Fiscal institutions are anticipated to alleviate collective action problems during the budget process, thereby maximizing budgetary joint gains. Municipal TELs are particularly expected to reduce municipal reliance on property taxes and to curb the size of total expenditures. If municipal TELs fail to meet these expectations, they may be subject to criticism that TELs are state interventions incorrectly designed, mechanisms that incorrectly reflect taxpayers' preferences, or the result of symbolic politics. The findings of this study illuminate that the capacity of municipal TELs in achieving the objectives is dependent upon their institutional design. The current forms of limitations across states, however, are not successfully designed for the multiple target outcomes. Some other institutions are anticipated to interact with municipal TELs. Several expected and unexpected results of such interactions are also reported in this study. This study is an attempt to learn from state and municipal government experiences about how different designs of state-imposed restrictions on municipal taxing and fiscal behavior generate varying fiscal outcomes at the municipal level and how to make fiscal rules work for certain municipal fiscal outcomes. The dissertation can contribute to the field by offering a relatively new approach to them, that is, a game-theoretic thinking of TELs. The findings are also expected to present empirical evidence about the relationship between TELs and municipal fiscal outcomes. The results can also provide useful guidance for policy makers whose job is to (re)design TELs and other fiscal rules for intended budgetary outcomes at the municipal level.
机译：本文旨在探讨这个问题，国家规定的市政税收和支出限制（TELs）的制度设计对市政财政成果是否重要？作为控制政府规模，提高效率和问责制的工具，自加利福尼亚州第13号提案以来，电话服务已受到广泛关注。但是，电话服务的影响仍然是一个开放的经验性问题，尤其是在市政一级。尽管有学者试图解决这个问题，但显然存在三个局限性。首先，文献未能提供有关电话服务作用的理论解释。先前的研究依赖于某种程度不足的方法，这些方法在发展假设方面存在缺陷。其次，TEL文献集中在衡量限制的某些特征上，例如TEL的存在及其约束性质；他们还没有完全抓住市政电话的制度异质性，这主要是由于各州对电话安排的选择存在差异。第三，很少有研究研究电话的影响是如何通过其他制度因素来调节的。为了填补这些研究空白，本研究调查了电话的制度设计与市政税收和财政行为之间的联系。本研究的理论框架建立在制度博弈论方法的基础上，强调了规则设计，制度多样性和交易成本在使制度运作和理解制度中的作用。它激发了我一个假设，即由预算参与者的集体决定所决定的市政财政结果可能会有所不同，这取决于不同形式的市政电话可能产生的激励结构以及电话与其他机构环境之间的相互作用。基于机构的博弈论思想，提出了一种将市政电话运营化的新方法，将局限分为六个不同的机构设计。系统通用的矩方法解决了内生性的潜在问题，被用来测试设计不同的市政电话的不同影响以及它们与国家施加的债券公投要求，国家施加的平衡预算要求以及城市形式的相互作用。政府。几个财政结果指标，例如财产税和其他收入，总支出和分类支出，未偿债务和基金准备金，被认为是左侧变量。预计财政机构将减轻预算过程中的集体行动问题，从而最大限度地增加预算联合收益。特别希望市政电话能减少市政对财产税的依赖，并减少总支出的规模。如果市政电话公司不能满足这些期望，他们可能会受到批评，即电话公司是国家干预措施设计不当，机制错误地反映了纳税人的偏好或象征性政治的结果。这项研究的结果表明，市政电话公司实现目标的能力取决于其机构设计。但是，当前跨州的限制形式并未针对多个目标结果成功设计。预计其他一些机构将与市政电话联系。这项研究还报道了这种相互作用的一些预期和出乎意料的结果。这项研究旨在从州和市政府的经验中学习有关国家对市政税收和财政行为施加的不同限制设计如何在市政一级产生不同的财政结果以及如何使财政规则对某些市政财政结果起作用的经验。通过为他们提供一种相对较新的方法，即TEL的博弈论思维，可以为该领域做出贡献。预期结果还将提供有关电话与市政财政成果之间关系的经验证据。该结果还可以为决策者提供有用的指导，他们的任务是（重新）设计电话和其他财政规则，以实现市级预期的预算结果。

著录项

  • 作者

    Park, Sungho.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Nebraska at Omaha.;

  • 授予单位 University of Nebraska at Omaha.;
  • 学科 Public administration.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2018
  • 页码 388 p.
  • 总页数 388
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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