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Three essays on executive compensation.

机译：关于高管薪酬的三篇论文。

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摘要

Executive compensation and its potential importance in aligning shareholder and management interests has been an extensively researched area within corporate finance. We study executive compensation while addressing several unresolved issues in the literature.;In essay one, we examine CEO compensation following spin-offs. We find that CEOs are rewarded for undertaking a spin-off. Change in compensation for CEOs of spin-off firms following spin-offs is significantly higher than that for matching firms. We also find that the increase in compensation following spin-off is negatively associated with the change in firm size following the spin-off. Unlike mergers and acquisitions through which increases in executive compensation seem to be more related to size than performance, we show that CEO compensation increases following spin-offs even though spin-offs reduce firm size.;In the second essay, we study changes in CEO salaries and their relation to firm performance. We document that changes in CEO salaries, which are a more permanent form of compensation change, are related to long term measures of performance. We find that CEO salaries change much more in relation to long term stock returns than short term stock returns. We also study the asymmetry in the relation between salary changes and firm performance. We find that while short term negative returns are related to changes in CEO salaries; only long term positive returns are significantly associated with CEO salary changes. This asymmetric relation is also present between total CEO compensation changes and stock returns.;In essay three, we examine managerial decision horizons for target and acquirer firms in mergers and acquisitions. We find that acquirer CEOs have longer decision horizons than target firm CEOs in stock financed mergers. Acquirer CEOs in cash financed mergers and acquisitions also have longer decision horizons than target CEOs. Acquirer CEOs in both stock and cash financed mergers have significantly higher proportions of equity based compensation and significantly lower proportions of cash based compensation than target CEOs. In logistic regressions, measures of decision horizons for target and acquirer CEOs are not significantly related to the odds of stock financing in mergers and acquisitions. Our results do not offer strong support to the implications from the Shleifer and Vishny theory on the rationale for stock financed acquisitions.
机译：高管薪酬及其在调整股东和管理层利益方面的潜在重要性一直是公司财务领域的广泛研究领域。在研究文献中几个未解决的问题时，我们研究了高管薪酬；在第一篇文章中，我们研究了分拆后的CEO薪酬。我们发现，首席执行官们因进行分拆而获得回报。分拆后，对分立公司的首席执行官的薪酬变化明显高于对等公司的变化。我们还发现，分拆后的薪酬增加与分拆后的公司规模变化负相关。与并购不同，并购后高管薪酬的增加似乎与规模而不是绩效有关，我们表明即使分拆减少了公司规模，CEO的薪酬也会在分拆之后增加。在第二篇文章中，我们研究了CEO的变动薪金及其与公司绩效的关系。我们记录到，CEO薪资的变化（这是薪酬变化的一种更永久的形式），与长期绩效挂钩。我们发现，与长期股票收益相比，CEO的薪资相对于长期股票收益的变化要大得多。我们还研究了工资变动与公司绩效之间的不对称性。我们发现，虽然短期的负回报与CEO工资的变化有关；只有长期的正回报与首席执行官的薪酬变动显着相关。 CEO薪酬总额变化与股票收益之间也存在这种不对称关系。在第三篇文章中，我们研究了目标企业和收购方在并购中的管理决策视野。我们发现，在股票融资合并中，收购方首席执行官比目标公司首席执行官具有更长的决策视野。现金融资并购中的收购方首席执行官比目标首席执行官拥有更长的决策期。与目标公司首席执行官相比，股票和现金融资合并中的收购方首席执行官的股权薪酬比例明显更高，而基于现金的薪酬比例则明显较低。在逻辑回归中，目标和收购方CEO的决策视野的度量与并购中股票融资的几率没有显着相关。我们的结果并未为Shleifer和Vishny理论对股票融资收购的理论依据提供强有力的支持。

著录项

  • 作者

    Sharma, Vaibhav.;

  • 作者单位

    Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.;

  • 授予单位 Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.;
  • 学科 Business Administration Management.;Economics General.;Economics Finance.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2009
  • 页码 129 p.
  • 总页数 129
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 贸易经济;财政、金融;经济学;
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:38:29

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