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Three essays on public economics and heterogeneity.

机译：关于公共经济学和异质性的三篇论文。

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摘要

This thesis presents a collection of essays about Public Economics and individual heterogeneity. The essays are motivated by two different subjects. The first subject refers to the relation between economic outcomes and majority voting in a democratic regime. More specifically, the outcome regarding redistributive labor income taxes is analyzed when heterogeneous individuals vote, once and for all, over an infinite sequence of taxes. The second subject refers to time consistency problems in Public Economics. Issues about optimal fiscal policy are considered in an environment where different individuals hold distinct information about (sequential) action performed by the government. This friction prevents the standard punishment mechanism that enforces good policy outcomes or, alternatively, inhibits the occurrence of time consistency problems. The best equilibrium outcome is then analyzed in this new situation.;Chapters 2 focus on the first subject. Moreover, the chapter explores the relationship between changes in labor income inequality and movements in labor taxes over the last decades in the US. In order to do so, this relation is modeled through a political economy channel by developing a median voter result over sequence of taxes. We consider an infinite horizon economy in which agents are heterogeneous with respect to both initial wealth and labor skills. We study indirect preferences over redistributive fiscal policies - sequences of affine taxes on and capital income - that can be supported as a competitive equilibrium. The paper assumes balanced growth preferences and full commitment. The first result is the following: if initial capital holdings are an affine function of skills, then the best fiscal policy for the agent with the median labor skill is preferred to any other policy by at least half of the individuals in the economy. The second result provides the characterization of the most preferred tax sequence by the median agent: marginal taxes on labor depend directly on the absolute value of the distance between the median and the mean value of the skill distribution. We extend the above results to an economy in which the distribution of skills evolves stochastically over time. A temporary increase in inequality could imply either higher or lower labor taxes, depending on the sign of the correlation between inequality and aggregate labor. The calibrated model does a good job on fitting both the increasing trend and the levels of labor taxes in the last decades, and also on matching some short run co-movements.;Chapter 3 generalizes the median voter theorem developed in chapter 2 to a situation where there is no commitment or, alternatively, voting is sequential over time. More specifically, the same equilibrium definition as in Bernheim and Slavov (2008) is adopted.;Chapter 4 deals with optimal fiscal policy when the government takes actions sequentially over time and cannot commit to a pre-specified plan of actions. These features potentially generate what is known in the literature as time consistency problems. Although these problems play an important role in public policy, game theoretical models in macroeconomics seem to indicate the opposite. Due to the complexity of this kind of models, it is commonly assumed that information is complete and perfect. In turn, this assumption becomes the key element that allows agents to coordinate perfectly to punish the government if it does not do what private agents want. As a result, a wide range of feasible payoffs can be sustained as equilibrium, including the best payoff under commitment. Since this approach is widely used for normative purposes a natural question emerges: are the above results robust to small variations in information? This paper analyzes an investment taxation problem in an economy with incomplete information. Specifically, we study an environment with the following main characteristics: (1) the aggregate productivity (fundamental) is stochastic, (2) only the government observes it and; (3) every agent privately receives a noisy signal about the fundamental. The first characteristic implies that the best policy (tax on investment) with commitment is state contingent. The second and third characteristics make the information incomplete. In particular, agents have different information sets, and therefore different beliefs, about the true state of the economy. As a result, independently of the accuracy of the signal, incomplete information reduces the set of equilibrium payoffs. First, we show that any policy that depends solely on the fundamental cannot be an equilibrium. Second, the best equilibrium policy is independent of the fundamental. Finally, for any discount factor strictly smaller than one and for any size of the noise, the best equilibrium is inefficient.
机译：本文提出了有关公共经济学和个体异质性的论文集。论文的主题是两个不同的主题。第一个主题是指民主政体中经济成果与多数投票之间的关系。更具体地说，当异类个人对无限数量的税收一劳永逸地投票时，将分析有关再分配劳动所得税的结果。第二个主题涉及公共经济学中的时间一致性问题。在不同的人持有有关政府执行的（顺序）行动的不同信息的环境中，会考虑有关最佳财政政策的问题。这种摩擦阻止了强制执行良好政策结果的标准惩罚机制，或者阻止了时间一致性问题的发生。然后在这种新情况下分析最佳的均衡结果。第2章关注第一个主题。此外，本章探讨了美国近几十年来劳动收入不平等的变化与劳动税变动之间的关系。为了做到这一点，这种关系是通过政治经济学的渠道来建模的，即通过对税率序列得出中位数的选民结果。我们考虑一个无限期的经济，在这种经济中，代理人在初始财富和劳动技能方面都是不同的。我们研究了对再分配性财政政策的间接偏好-仿射税和资本收入的序列-可以作为竞争均衡的依据。本文假设均衡的增长偏好和充分承诺。第一个结果如下：如果初始资本持有是技能的仿射函数，那么经济中至少有一半的人比其他任何政策都更喜欢具有中等劳动技能的代理商的最佳财政政策。第二个结果提供了中位数代理商最优先税制的特征：劳动边际税直接取决于中位数与技能分布平均值之间距离的绝对值。我们将以上结果扩展到技能分配随时间随机变化的经济中。不平等的暂时增加可能意味着更高或更低的劳动税，这取决于不平等与总劳动之间的相关关系。经过校准的模型在适应过去几十年的增长趋势和劳动税水平方面以及在匹配一些短期联动方面都做得很好。第三章将第二章中提出的中位数选民定理概括为一种情况。没有承诺的地方，或者随着时间的推移投票是连续的。更具体地说，采用与Bernheim和Slavov（2008）中相同的均衡定义。;第4章处理最优财政政策，当政府随着时间的流逝依次采取行动而不能承诺预先制定的行动计划时。这些功能可能会产生文献中称为时间一致性问题的信息。尽管这些问题在公共政策中起着重要作用，但宏观经济学中的博弈论模型似乎表明了相反的情况。由于这种模型的复杂性，通常假定信息是完整和完美的。反过来，这种假设成为关键要素，如果代理机构不按照私人代理人的意愿行事，它便可以使代理机构完美地协调惩罚政府。结果，可以维持各种可行的收益作为均衡，包括承诺下的最佳收益。由于这种方法被广泛用于规范目的，因此出现了一个自然的问题：以上结果是否对信息的微小变化具有鲁棒性？本文分析了信息不完全的经济中的投资税收问题。具体而言，我们研究具有以下主要特征的环境：（1）总生产率（基本）是随机的，（2）只有政府观察到它；以及（3）每个代理人都会私下收到有关基本面的嘈杂信号。第一个特征意味着具有承诺的最佳政策（投资税）是国家或有条件的。第二和第三特征使信息不完整。尤其是，代理人对经济的真实状态具有不同的信息集，因此具有不同的信念。结果，不依赖于信号的准确性，不完整的信息减少了平衡收益的集合。首先，我们证明，任何仅依赖基本面的政策都不可能是均衡的。其次，最佳均衡政策独立于基本面。最后，对于任何严格小于1的折现因子以及任何大小的噪声，最佳平衡都是无效的。

著录项

  • 作者

    Schneider, Anderson Luis.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Minnesota.;

  • 授予单位 University of Minnesota.;
  • 学科 Economics Theory.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2009
  • 页码 141 p.
  • 总页数 141
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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