Based on principal-agent theory,this paper exemplifies Chinese companies listed with A Shares in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2016,to study impacts of tax avoidance upon value of corporate cash holdings. It is concluded that tax avoidance doesn't increase value of cash holdings in any sample;it increases value of cash holdings in groups with low agency costs for managers and shareholders;it leads to a decline in value of corporate cash holdings in groups with high agency costs of managers and shareholders. After further analysis,it is discovered that high-quality information disclosure and high shareholding ration of institution investors positively regulate relationships between tax avoidance and value of corporate cash holdings. All above research conclusions are of certain guiding significance for deeper understanding of enterprises' behaviors of tax avoidance and how to increase value of corporate cash holdings.%在委托代理理论框架下,以我国沪深两市A股2008-2016年上市公司为样本,研究税收规避对企业现金持有价值的影响.研究结论表明,全样本中税收规避没有增加企业现金持有价值;在管理者代理成本低组和控股股东代理成本低组,税收规避增加了企业现金持有价值;在管理者代理成本高组和控股股东代理成本高组,税收规避降低了企业现金持有价值.进一步分析发现,信息披露质量高和机构投资者持股比例高在税收规避与现金持有价值的关系中具有正向调节作用.以上研究结论对于深入理解企业税收规避行为以及如何提高企业现金持有价值具有一定的指导意义.
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