Online innovation contest is a new effective way for open innovation. The sponsor, either corporate or individual, can submit contest problems online to seek solutions from a variety of solvers, and the solver who submits the best solution will get the award set by the sponsor. This new electronic commerce model is gaining more and more attention from researchers and practitioners. One of the serious problems in online innovation contest is sponsor's fraud behavior by registering two accounts in the same online contest platform and choosing himself as the winner while adopting solutions submitted by other solvers. Trust for sponsor which is critical factor influencing users, behavior is reduced by sponsors, fraud. This paper aimed to study: i) the antecedents of solvers, trust in sponsor;ii) how contest platform set the optimal fraud detection effort. For the first issue, a research model based on trust theory is constructed, and a survey was undertaken to test the model. The research results indicate that the current reputation mechanism to foster trust does not influence solvers, trust significantly, and the online platform's credibility and the solvers, satisfaction of past experience are vital to trust. The results from survey highlighted the importance of the online innovation contest platform service quality. For question two, a game theory model is constructed, and the optimal fraud detection effort balancing the reputation cost and detection cost is obtained with backward induction method. Implications and research extensions are identified to guide further research in this area.%困扰网上创新竞争发展的一个重要因素是发布者作弊问题,它降低了解答者对发布者的信任,网络平台也采取各种方法监督作弊行为.为此,研究2个紧密关联的问题:①影响解答者对发布者信任的因素;②网络平台如何设定合适的监督水平.对问题①,基于信任理论构建研究模型,通过大样本问卷调研检验假设,结果表明:现有的信誉机制作用不显著,而网络平台本身的信誉和解答者满意度对信任有显著影响.实证研究结果凸显了网络平台服务水平的重要性,也是研究问题②的驱动因素.问题②的研究方法是博弈论,通过逆向求解,分析网络平台如何平衡成本和信誉来制定监督水平.最后,给出了主要结论以及未来的研究方向.
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