首页> 中文期刊> 《计算机集成制造系统》 >闭环供应链碳减排和低碳宣传决策与协调

闭环供应链碳减排和低碳宣传决策与协调

         

摘要

For study the carbon emission reduction and low-carbon promotion in closed loop supply chain,a game model of closed loop supply chain was developed under four different Stackelberg structures (vertical Nash,retailerled,manufacturer-led and centralized decision),and the optimal decisions and optimal profits of four different Stackelberg structures were comparative analysis.The corresponding decentralized structures were coordinate by Shapley value method and shared system revenue increment mechanism,and the member's profits were compared before and after coordination.The research showed that,for decentralized structures,the low-carbon promotion effort,carbon emission reduction level,collection level,retail price and supply chain entire profits were best under vertical Nash structure;the wholesale price and manufacturer's profits were best under manufacturer-led structure;the retail margin and retailer's profits were best under retailer-led structure.Two coordination mechanisms could effectively increase the profits of manufacturer and retailer under the decentralized structures.The coordination effects of two coordination mechanisms on the profits of manufacturer and retailer under the decentralized structure were compared by numerical analysis.%为了研究闭环供应链的碳减排和低碳宣传问题,首先分别构建了零售商主导、制造商主导,无主导和供应链集中4种不同Stackelberg结构的闭环供应链博弈模型,对比分析了4种不同Stackelberg结构的最优决策和最优利润.其次,引入Shapley值法和共享系统收益增量机制对相应的分散式结构进行协调,并对比协调前后的供应链成员利润.研究表明,对于分散式结构,无主导结构的低碳宣传努力程度、碳减排水平、回收水平、零售价格和供应链整体利润最优,制造商主导结构的批发价格和制造商利润最优,零售商主导结构的单位零售利润和零售商利润最优.两种协调机制均能有效提高分散式结构的制造商和零售商利润.最后,结合算例分析,对比两种协调机制对分散式结构下制造商和零售商利润的协调效果.

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