首页> 中文期刊> 《工业技术经济》 >基于佣金定价决策的供应链金融平台利益权衡机制研究

基于佣金定价决策的供应链金融平台利益权衡机制研究

         

摘要

As an intermediary supply chain financial platform,it is essential to establish an e ffective commission pricing mechanism to coordinate the interests with the custo mers.Based on the concept of Rubens bargaining game and the background of credit or's rights financing business,this paper constructs the bargaining game model of the supply chain financial intermediary platform and the client on the commis sion decision under the condition of asymmetric information.Through the game ana lysis,we get the optimal pricing mechanism of the platform,and a reasonable weig hing of interests between the platform and the customers can be achieved accordi ng to the commission pricing.Finally,an example is given to verify the pricing m echanism of the platform.%中介性质的供应链金融平台,创建与客户利益有效协调的佣金定价机制至关重要.本文运用鲁宾斯轮流讨价还价博弈思想,以债权融资业务为背景,构建了信息不对称情况下供应链金融中介平台与客户关于佣金决策的讨价还价博弈模型.通过博弈分析得出了平台的最优佣金定价机制,按此佣金定价,可实现平台与客户利益的合理权衡.最后,对平台的定价机制进行了算例验证.

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