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PRICING DECISION AND COORDINATION CONTRACT IN LOW-CARBON TOURISM SUPPLY CHAINS BASED ON ALTRUISM PREFERENCE

机译:基于利他主义偏好的低碳旅游供应链定价决策与协调合同

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摘要

The optimal pricing strategies and coordination contract of providers of low carbon tourism products and services (TCP) and an online travel agency (OTA) are discussed based on altruism preference of decision makers. A competition model is established to compare and analyze the revenue, pricing strategies and coordination conditions in Stackelberg game model. According to the study and comparison results, altruism preference can directly influence decision-makers' decisions and supply chain. Meanwhile, information symmetry can determine decision making. If altruism preference of TCP increases, the overall profit of the supply chain will be enhanced in spite of the information symmetry. When Altruism Preference of OTA platform increases, the overall profit of the supply chain will decrease in the case of information symmetry. As for information asymmetry, the overall supply chain profit will decease with increasing altruism preference. Moreover, numerical examples are taken to analyze the profits of OTA and TCP in revenue coordination. Finally, some suggestions are proposed for the establishment of coordination contract.
机译:基于决策者的利他主义偏好,讨论了低碳旅游产品和服务提供者和在线旅行社(OTA)的最佳定价策略和协调合同。建立竞争模式,以比较和分析Stackelberg游戏模型的收入,定价策略和协调条件。根据研究和比较结果,利他主义偏好可以直接影响决策者的决定和供应链。同时,信息对称可以确定决策。如果采伐TCP的偏好增加,则尽管有信息对称,供应链的整体利润将得到加强。当OTA平台的利他主义偏好增加时,供应链的整体利润将在信息对称的情况下降低。至于信息不对称,随着利他主义偏好,整体供应链利润将减少。此外,采用数值示例分析了OTA和TCP在收入协调中的利润。最后,建议建立协调合同的一些建议。

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