中国的财政分权改革主要发生在中央与省关系层面,省以下分权由地方政府参照＂中央—省＂的制度安排自行调整。中国县级数据的实证结果表明,地方政府的＂双重援助依赖＂引起了省以下政府的过度集权。与县级政府相比,省级政府的权力和资源更容易被地方精英所觊觎,并产生更大的＂横财效应＂和＂贪婪效应＂。资本等生产要素在省内的流动性比省际间要高,分权条件下县级政府为增长而竞争的激励更强。＂省直管县＂制度难以孕育县级经济发展动力,对根本解决县乡财政困难作用有限,借鉴＂命令模式＂建立省以下分权制度可能找到解决之道。%This paper empirically tests the relationship of intergovernmental grant and intraregional fiscal decentralization.The results show that ＇doubling grant dependency＇ brings over concentraliztion of intraregional government.The power and resource held by provincial politician are easily captured by regional elites,and boost the windfall effect and voracity effect.The movement of productive factor is higher in intraregion than that of interregion,so the county government has stronger incentive to compete for growth.The arrangement of province directly controlling county cannot deal with the fiscal embarrassment facing by county government,the paper suggests the mandate model could be the prescription.
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