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具有限制结盟结构的供应链合作创新及其收益分配

         

摘要

针对具有限制结盟结构特征的三级供应链合作创新联盟问题,分析了由单个供应商、制造商和销售商组成的不同联盟系统下的收益情况,并运用图合作博弈的average tree solution(简称"A-T解")法对各成员的收益进行了分配.结果表明,所有成员参与供应链联盟时总收益最大,且A-T解分配法与Shapley值法相比更具合理性和有效性,能充分突出成员在合作联盟中的特殊地位(位置)及其重要性,该结论进一步通过比较不同级别结构下的供应链收益分配问题进行说明.%In view of the three levels supply chain co-innovation with restricted alliance structure characteristic, we analyze the profits of different supply chain innovation alliance system, which is composed of a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer.And the average tree solution(for short"A-T solution")of graph cooperative game is used for the profit allocation.The results show that the supply chain profit is maximum when all players in alli-ance,and the profit allocation is more reasonable and effective by comparing A-T value with Shapley value.The method fully stresses the special importance of player's position in structure.In addition,the conclusion is illus-trated by contrasting restricted alliance structure with different levels of profit allocation in supply chain.

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