以我国多元化公司中管理者利用内部资本市场进行资金错配攫取私利行为为背景，研究管理者股权激励对多元化公司内部资本市场效率和公司价值的影响。通过建立双重委托代理模型，选取2009-2014年我国A股上市公司面板数据进行实证检验。结果发现：①多元化公司内部资本市场效率随管理者股权激励水平的提高而提高；②管理者股权激励水平提高最终导致多元化公司价值增加，内部资本市场在其中起部分中介作用；③公司多元化水平影响管理者股权激励对内部资本市场效率和公司价值的促进效应。%This paper uses double principal-agent theory as the basis to establish the theoretical model to which analyzes the effect of managers'stock incentives on the allocation efficiency of the internal capital markets and the corporate value.We select panel data of A-share listed companies of our country from 2009 to 2014 to test the results of the theoretical model. The study finds that:the higher stock incentives are,the more efficient allocation efficiency of the internal capital markets get;the managers'higher stock incentives are,the more corporate value will be;the role of managers'stock incentives in promoting the corporate value will decrease as the level of corporate diversification increasing.
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