首页> 中文期刊> 《价值工程》 >政府碳减排政策方式选择的博弈研究

政府碳减排政策方式选择的博弈研究

         

摘要

Based on the properties of the carbon tax policy and cap-and-trade policy, three-stage game models between the government and enterprises were constructed in a cap-and-trade scenario, a carbon taxe scenario and a hybrid policy and compared with each other. The results showed that when drawing up the price of cap-and-trade higher than the rate of carbon tax, the goverment should implement cap-and-trade mechanism;when drawing up the rate of carbon tax higher than the price of cap-and-trade, the goverment should implement carbon tax mechanism. Because the government can achieve a higher level of social welfare, the price and market share of low-carbon goods are much higher and larger and the manufacturer of low-carbon goods can obtain more profits in both cases, which help low-carbon products dominate the market, reduce carbon emissions and promote national low-carbon economy.%本文根据碳税和碳排放交易的政策属性,构建了在单一碳交易、单一碳税以及碳交易与碳税相结合的复合政策下政府与企业之间的三阶段博弈模型,并通过逆向求解,对这三种减排政策进行了比较分析。研究发现:政府制定的碳交易价格相对于碳税税率较高时,应选择实施碳交易减排机制;政府制定的碳税税率相对于碳交易价格较高时,应选择实施碳税减排政策,在这两种情况下社会福利水平较高,低碳商品的价格较高,市场份额较大,生产低碳商品制造商获得的利润较大,有助于低碳产品占领市场,从而减少碳排放,促进国家低碳经济的发展。

著录项

相似文献

  • 中文文献
  • 外文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号