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首页> 美国卫生研究院文献>International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health >What Role Should Government Play in the Personal Carbon Trading Market: Motivator or Punisher?
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What Role Should Government Play in the Personal Carbon Trading Market: Motivator or Punisher?

机译：政府在个人碳交易市场中应扮演什么角色：动机还是惩罚者？

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With increasing downstream carbon emissions, the implementation of a personal carbon trading scheme is urgently required. In order to facilitate the progress, government departments are supposed to adopt a motivating or punitive policy to make guidance for downstream carbon emissions reduction. This study determined and verified the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) of government departments and individuals whose carbon emissions exceeded the initial carbon allowance (CEEICA individuals) by using the evolutionary game and numerical simulation methods, respectively. The findings show that the ESS of government departments is always a punitive policy during the variation of strategies of CEEICA individuals. The ESS of CEEICA individuals is an active plan when the added cost (the difference between emissions reduction cost and trading earning) is less than the carbon tax; otherwise, it is a passive plan. Furthermore, the rate of convergence can be significantly influenced by the probabilistic distances between initial strategies and the ESSs. On the basis of these findings, this study suggested implementing a “punishment first, motivation-supplemented” policy, and developing a stable operational mechanism for a personal carbon trading market.
机译：随着下游碳排放量的增加，迫切需要实施个人碳交易计划。为了促进进展，政府部门应该采取激励或惩罚性政策来指导下游碳减排。本研究分别通过进化博弈和数值模拟方法确定并验证了碳排放量超过初始碳配额的政府部门和个人的进化稳定策略（ESS）。研究结果表明，在中东欧个人战略变化过程中，政府部门的环境与社会行为始终是一种惩罚性政策。当增加的成本（减排成本与交易收益之间的差额）小于碳税时，CEEICA个人的ESS是一项积极的计划。否则，这是一个被动的计划。此外，初始策略与ESS之间的概率距离会显着影响收敛速度。基于这些发现，本研究建议实施“惩罚为先，动力为辅”的政策，并为个人碳交易市场建立稳定的运行机制。

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