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首页> 美国卫生研究院文献>Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences >Selection for protection in an ant–plant mutualism: host sanctions host modularity and the principal–agent game
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Selection for protection in an ant–plant mutualism: host sanctions host modularity and the principal–agent game

机译：在蚂蚁与植物之间的互惠关系中进行保护的选择：宿主制裁宿主模块化以及委托人与代理人的博弈

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Retaliation against cheaters can prevent the breakdown of cooperation. Here we ask whether the ant–plant Cordia nodosa is able to apply retaliatory sanctions against its ant symbiont Allomerus octoarticulatus, which patrols new shoots to prevent herbivory. We test the hypothesis that the modular design of C. nodosa physiologically ties the growth of housing (stem swellings known as domatia) to the successful development of the attached leaves. We experimentally simulated herbivory by cutting leaves from patrolled shoots and found that the domatia on such ‘cheated’ shoots suffered higher mortality and lower growth than did controls, evidence for a host sanction. On the other hand, patrolling is costly to the ant, and experiment shows that non-patrollers run a low risk of being sanctioned because most leaves (and the attached domatia) escape heavy herbivory even when patrollers are absent. This suggests that cheaters might enjoy a higher fitness than do mutualists, despite sanctions, but we find that patrolling provides a net fecundity benefit when the colony and plant exceed a minimum size, which requires sustained ant investment in patrolling. These results map directly onto the principal–agent (P–A) game from economics, which we suggest can be used as a framework for studying stability in mutualisms, where high sampling costs and cheating do not allow market effects to select for mutual benefits.
机译：对作弊者的报复可以防止合作破裂。在这里，我们要问蚂蚁植物结Cor是否能够对它的蚂蚁共生物Allomerus octoarticulatus采取报复性制裁，该新手巡逻新芽以防止草食。我们测试了假单胞菌的模块化设计在生理上将房屋的生长（称为多米那病的茎肿胀）与附着叶的成功发育联系起来的假设。我们通过从巡逻的枝上切下叶子来实验性地对草食动物进行了模拟，发现与“对照”相比，这种“被欺骗”的枝上的食区的死亡率更高，生长速度更低，这是宿主制裁的证据。另一方面，巡逻对蚂蚁来说是昂贵的，并且实验表明，非巡逻者受到制裁的风险较低，因为即使没有巡逻者，大多数叶子（和附着的果园）也逃脱了重的食草动物。这表明，尽管受到制裁，作弊者可能比互助者更适合，但我们发现，当种群和植物超过最小规模时，巡逻可提供净的繁殖力收益，这需要在巡逻中持续进行蚂蚁投资。这些结果直接映射到经济学的委托-代理（P-A）博弈中，我们建议将其用作研究共生关系稳定性的框架，因为高抽样成本和欺诈行为不允许市场效应选择互惠互利。

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