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首页> 美国卫生研究院文献>Frontiers in Physiology >Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism
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Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism

机译：忘记民间：道德责任保存动机和其他相容性条件

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For years, experimental philosophers have attempted to discern whether laypeople find free will compatible with a scientifically deterministic understanding of the universe, yet no consensus has emerged. The present work provides one potential explanation for these discrepant findings: People are strongly motivated to preserve free will and moral responsibility, and thus do not have stable, logically rigorous notions of free will. Seven studies support this hypothesis by demonstrating that a variety of logically irrelevant (but motivationally relevant) features influence compatibilist judgments. In Study 1, participants who were asked to consider the possibility that our universe is deterministic were more compatibilist than those not asked to consider this possibility, suggesting that determinism poses a threat to moral responsibility, which increases compatibilist responding (thus reducing the threat). In Study 2, participants who considered concrete instances of moral behavior found compatibilist free will more sufficient for moral responsibility than participants who were asked about moral responsibility more generally. In Study 3a, the order in which participants read free will and determinism descriptions influenced their compatibilist judgments–and only when the descriptions had moral significance: Participants were more likely to report that determinism was compatible with free will than that free will was compatible with determinism. In Study 3b, participants who read the free will description first (the more compatibilist group) were particularly likely to confess that their beliefs in free will and moral responsibility and their disbelief in determinism influenced their conclusion. In Study 4, participants reduced their compatibilist beliefs after reading a passage that argued that moral responsibility could be preserved even in the absence of free will. Participants also reported that immaterial souls were compatible with scientific determinism, most strongly among immaterial soul believers (Study 5), and evaluated information about the capacities of primates in a biased manner favoring the existence of human free will (Study 6). These results suggest that people do not have one intuition about whether free will is compatible with determinism. Instead, people report that free will is compatible with determinism when desiring to uphold moral responsibility. Recommendations for future work are discussed.
机译：多年以来，实验哲学家一直试图辨别外行人是否发现自由意志与对宇宙的科学确定性理解是相容的，但尚未达成共识。当前的工作为这些不同的发现提供了一种可能的解释：人们强烈地维护自由意志和道德责任，因此没有稳定的，逻辑上严格的自由意志概念。七项研究通过证明各种逻辑上不相关（但在动机上相关）的特征会影响相容性判断，从而支持了这一假设。在研究1中，被要求考虑我们的宇宙具有确定性的可能性的参与者比没有被要求考虑这种可能性的参与者更具相容性，这表明确定性对道德责任构成了威胁，这增加了相容主义者的反应（从而减少了威胁）。在研究2中，考虑到道德行为的具体实例而发现没有相容剂的参与者比被普遍问到道德责任的参与者更能承担道德责任。在研究3a中，参与者阅读自由意志和确定性描述的顺序会影响他们的相容性判断-且只有当描述具有道德意义时：与自由意志与确定性相容相比，参与者更有可能报告确定性与自由意志相容。在研究3b中，最先阅读自由意志描述的参与者（更具相容性的群体）尤其可能承认，他们对自由意志和道德责任的信念以及对决定论的不信任会影响他们的结论。在研究4中，参与者阅读了一段文章声称即使在没有自由意志的情况下也可以维护道德责任，从而降低了他们的相容性信念。参与者还报告说，非物质灵魂与科学决定论相一致，在非物质灵魂信徒中最为强烈（研究5），并以偏向于有利于人类自由意志存在的方式评估了有关灵长类动物能力的信息（研究6）。这些结果表明，人们对自由意志是否与决定论相容没有直觉。相反，人们报告说，当想要维护道德责任时，自由意志与决定论是相容的。讨论了对未来工作的建议。

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