...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Frontiers in Psychology >Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism
【24h】

Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism

机译：忘记民间：道德责任保护动机和其他兼容性条件

获取原文
   

获取外文期刊封面封底 >>

       
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

For years, experimental philosophers have attempted to discern whether laypeople find free will compatible with a scientifically deterministic understanding of the universe, yet no consensus has emerged. The present work provides one potential explanation for these discrepant findings: People are strongly motivated to preserve free will and moral responsibility, and thus do not have stable, logically rigorous notions of free will. Seven studies support this hypothesis by demonstrating that a variety of logically irrelevant (but motivationally relevant) features influence compatibilist judgments. In Study 1, participants who were asked to consider the possibility that our universe is deterministic were more compatibilist than those not asked to consider this possibility, suggesting that determinism poses a threat to moral responsibility, which increases compatibilist responding (thus reducing the threat). In Study 2, participants who considered concrete instances of moral behavior found compatibilist free will more sufficient for moral responsibility than participants who were asked about moral responsibility more generally. In Study 3a, the order in which participants read free will and determinism descriptions influenced their compatibilist judgments—and only when the descriptions had moral significance: Participants were more likely to report that determinism was compatible with free will than that free will was compatible with determinism. In Study 3b, participants who read the free will description first (the more compatibilist group) were particularly likely to confess that their beliefs in free will and moral responsibility and their disbelief in determinism influenced their conclusion. In Study 4, participants reduced their compatibilist beliefs after reading a passage that argued that moral responsibility could be preserved even in the absence of free will. Participants also reported that immaterial souls were compatible with scientific determinism, most strongly among immaterial soul believers (Study 5), and evaluated information about the capacities of primates in a biased manner favoring the existence of human free will (Study 6). These results suggest that people do not have one intuition about whether free will is compatible with determinism. Instead, people report that free will is compatible with determinism when desiring to uphold moral responsibility. Recommendations for future work are discussed.
机译：多年来，实验哲学家试图辨别Paypeople是否与科学确定性的理解兼容宇宙，但没有出现共识。目前的工作为这些差异调查结果提供了一个潜在的解释：人们强烈激励，以保护自由意志和道德责任，因此没有稳定的，逻辑上的自由意志。七项研究通过证明各种逻辑上无关（但有动力相关的）特征影响兼容性判决，七项研究支持这一假设。在研究1中，被要求考虑我们宇宙是决定性的可能性的参与者比未被要求考虑这种可能性的人更具增值者，这表明决定论构成道德责任的威胁，这增加了兼容性响应（从而降低了威胁）。在研究2中，考虑普遍的道德行为的具体实例的参与者发现相容主义者的自由将比道德责任更为足够的道德责任，而不是更普遍地被问及道德责任的参与者。在研究3A中，参与者读取自由意志和确定主义描述的命令影响了他们的兼容性判断 - 只有当描述具有道德意义时：参与者更有可能报告，决定论与自由的决定症兼容，而不是自由的意志与确定主义相容。在研究3B中，阅读自由意志描述的参与者首先（更加普遍的主义者组）特别可能承认他们对自由意志和道德责任的信念以及他们对决定主义的难以置信影响了他们的结论。在研究4中，参与者在阅读一篇辩论之后减少了他们的兼容性信念，据称即使在没有自由意志的情况下也可以保存道德责任。与会者还报告说，非物质灵魂与科学决定言相兼容，最强烈的无关灵魂信徒（研究5），并以有利于人类自由的存在的偏见方式评估有关灵长类动物能力的信息（研究6）。这些结果表明，人们没有一个直觉，关于自由是否与决定主义兼容。相反，人们报告在希望坚持道德责任时，自由将与决定论兼容。讨论了未来工作的建议。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号