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首页> 外文期刊>Accounting Review >Are Credit Ratings More Rigorous for Widely Covered Firms?
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Are Credit Ratings More Rigorous for Widely Covered Firms?

机译：覆盖广泛的公司的信用评级是否更加严格？

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摘要

We study how business press coverage can discipline credit rating agency actions. Because of their greater prominence and visibility to market participants, more widely covered firms can pose greater reputational costs for rating agencies. Consistent with rating agencies limiting such risk, we find that ratings for more widely covered firms are more timely and accurate, downgraded earlier and systematically lower in the year prior to default, and better predictors of default and non-default. We also find that the recent tightening of credit rating standards is largely explained by growing business press coverage of public debt issuers. Additionally, we find that credit rating agencies take explicit actions to improve their ratings by assigning better educated and more experienced analysts to widely covered firms. Moreover, we document that missed defaults of more visible firms create greater negative economic consequences for rating agencies, and that rating improvements following the financial crisis were greater for more visible firms.
机译：我们研究商业新闻报道如何约束信用评级机构的行为。由于它们在市场参与者中的突出地位和知名度，覆盖面更广的公司可能给评级机构带来更高的声誉成本。与限制此类风险的评级机构一致，我们发现，覆盖范围更广的公司的评级更及时，更准确，在违约前一年被降级并有系统地降低，以及更好的对违约和非违约的预测。我们还发现，最近信用评级标准的收紧在很大程度上是由于商业媒体对公共债务发行人的报道不断增加。此外，我们发现信用评级机构采取了明确的行动，通过为受广泛覆盖的公司分配受过良好教育和经验丰富的分析师来提高其评级。此外，我们记录到，错过更多可见企业的违约行为会给评级机构带来更大的负面经济后果，而金融危机后的评级改善对于可见企业而言更大。

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