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首页> 外文期刊>Accounting Review >Headline Salience, Managerial Opportunism, and Over- and Underreactions to Earnings
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Headline Salience, Managerial Opportunism, and Over- and Underreactions to Earnings

机译：标题突出，管理机会主义以及对收入的过度和反应不足

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Limited attention theory predicts that higher salience of earnings news implies a stronger immediate market reaction to earnings news and a weaker post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) or reversal (PEAR). Using a new measure, SALIENCE, defined as the number of quantitative items in an earnings press release headline, we find strong evidence consistent with salience effects. Higher SALIENCE is associated with stronger announcement reaction and subsequent PEAR. Managers are more likely to choose higher SALIENCE before selling shares in the post-announcement period and when earnings are high, but less persistent, and to choose lower SALIENCE before stock option grants. The results are robust to using residual salience and an extended set of control variables. The findings are consistent with managers opportunistically headlining positive financial information in the earnings press release to incite over-optimism in investors with limited attention.
机译：有限关注理论预测，收益新闻的显着性越高，意味着市场对收益新闻的即时反应越强，而收益后公告漂移（PEAD）或逆转（PEAR）则越弱。使用新的度量标准SALIENCE（定义为收益新闻发布标题中的量化项目数），我们发现有力的证据与显着效应一致。较高的SALIENCE与较强的公告反应和后续的PEAR相关。经理人更可能在公告后的时期，收益较高但持续性较低的股票出售前选择较高的SALIENCE，并在授予股票期权前选择较低的SALIENCE。结果对于使用剩余显着性和扩展的控制变量集是可靠的。这些发现与管理者在盈利新闻稿中机会性地报道积极的财务信息，以激发投资者的过度乐观，关注程度有限相一致。

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