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Do Debt Covenants Constrain Borrowings Prior to Violation? Evidence from SFAS 160

机译：债务契约在违规之前会约束借款吗？来自SFAS 160的证据

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摘要

Prior evidence shows a reduction in leverage after covenant violations, but we do not know whether covenants affect leverage before they are violated. In this study, we use an exogenous accounting-based shock to debt covenants that relaxed covenant tightness (SFAS 160) and examine whether covenants constrain leverage for borrowers that are close to violation, even when the borrower is financially healthy. We find that SFAS 160 increased debt levels in firms that were close to violation. This increase in debt was driven by financially healthy firms, suggesting the likelihood of future covenant violations could impede borrowing by firms. We also find an increase in investment sensitivity to Q after SFAS 160 in firms close to violation, suggesting the additional debt was used to make legitimate investments. Because SFAS 160 was passed in the midst of the financial crisis, it is difficult to generalize our findings to more normal financial periods.
机译：先前的证据表明，违反契约后杠杆率有所降低，但是我们不知道契约是否会在违约之前影响杠杆。在本研究中，我们对债务契约使用了基于外部会计的冲击，从而放松了契约紧度（SFAS 160），并检查了契约是否约束了接近违规的借款人的杠杆，即使借款人财务状况良好。我们发现SFAS 160增加了接近违规的公司的债务水平。债务的增加是由财务状况良好的公司推动的，这表明未来违反《公约》的可能性可能会阻碍公司的借款。在SFAS 160接近违规的公司中，我们还发现投资对Q的敏感性有所提高，这表明额外的债务用于进行合法投资。由于SFAS 160是在金融危机期间通过的，因此很难将我们的发现推广到更正常的财务时期。

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