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Baker on the Psychological Account of Personal Identity

机译：贝克关于个人身份的心理学解释

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Lynne Rudder Baker’s Constitution View of human persons has come under much recent scrutiny. Baker argues that each human person is constituted by, but not identical to, a human animal. Much of the critical discussion of Baker’s Constitution View has focused upon this aspect of her account. Less has been said about the positive diachronic account of personal identity offered by Baker. Baker argues that it is sameness of what she labels ‘first-person perspective’ that is essential to understanding personal identity over time. Baker claims that her account avoids the commitment to indeterminacy of personal identity entailed by the psychological account. Further, the psychological account, but not her account, is plagued by what Baker labels the ‘duplication problem’. In the end, I argue that neither of these considerations forces us to renounce the psychological account and adopt Baker’s favored account.
机译：Lynne Rudder Baker对人的宪法观点最近受到了严格审查。贝克辩称，每个人都是由动物构成的，但并不等同于动物。贝克的宪法观点的许多批判性讨论都集中在她陈述的这一方面。关于贝克所提供的关于个人身份的历时性的说法很少有人提及。贝克辩称，与她所说的“第一人称视角”相同，这对于随着时间的推移理解个人身份至关重要。贝克声称，她的帐户避免了因心理帐户而导致不确定个人身份的承诺。此外，贝克（Baker）所说的“重复问题”困扰着她的心理原因而不是她的说法。最后，我认为这些考虑都不能迫使我们放弃心理上的解释，而采用贝克的偏爱。

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