...
首页> 外文期刊>Adaptive Behavior >Extreme punishments characterize weak Pareto optimality
【24h】

Extreme punishments characterize weak Pareto optimality

机译:极端惩罚表现出弱的帕累托最优性

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

In normal form games, we model the largely observed psychological phenomenon of systematic and extreme punishment after a deviation, regardless of the cost. After establishing basic properties, we show that this notion characterizes a weak form of Pareto optimality. Every Pareto optimal outcome can also be sustained by the threat of extreme punishment, which cannot be achieved in general through Nash equilibria strategies, nor with tit-for-tat strategies.
机译:在正常形式的游戏中,我们模拟了偏差较大后观察到的系统性和极端惩罚的心理现象,而不论其代价如何。建立基本属性后,我们证明该概念表征了帕累托最优性的弱形式。每个帕累托最优结果也可以通过极端惩罚的威胁来维持,而这通常不能通过纳什均衡策略或针锋相对的策略来实现。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号