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首页> 外文期刊>American Journal of Political Science >The Lengthened Shadow of Another Institution? Ideal Point Estimates for the Executive Branch and Congress
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The Lengthened Shadow of Another Institution? Ideal Point Estimates for the Executive Branch and Congress

机译:另一个机构的阴影已拉长?行政部门和国会的理想点估计

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摘要

While the president's relationship to Congress has been carefully studied, the broader executive branch has received far less attention in that context. Scholars rely on assumptions about the relationship between the president and cabinet departments that remain untested. We construct the first statistical portrait of executive branch ideology by estimating ideal points for members of Congress, presidents, and the heads of cabinet-level departments between 1991 and 2004 in a Bayesian framework. We empirically assess claims about the composition of the president's administrative team and the influence of institutions on the ideology of principal executive decision makers. We also test an important claim regarding the trade-off between ideological congruence and budgetary authority to demonstrate the utility of our estimates for other scholars. Our analysis reveals a new picture of the executive branch as ideologically diverse, casting into doubt some essential assumptions in a substantial body of work on the separation of powers.
机译:尽管已经仔细研究了总统与国会的关系,但在这种情况下,更广泛的行政部门受到的关注却很少。学者们依赖关于总统与内阁部门之间关系的假设,这些假设尚未得到检验。我们通过估计贝叶斯框架下1991年至2004年期间的国会议员,总统和内阁级部门负责人的理想观点,来构建行政部门意识形态的第一个统计肖像。我们根据经验评估有关总统行政团队组成以及机构对主要行政决策者意识形态影响的主张。我们还测试了有关意识形态一致性和预算权限之间权衡的一项重要主张,以证明我们的估计对其他学者的实用性。我们的分析揭示了行政部门在意识形态上多样化的新图景,使人们对实质性的三权分立工作中的一些基本假设产生怀疑。

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