The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems

摘要

There is an old principle in warfare that "quantity has a quality all of its own." The accuracy of this maxim has become more questionable in recent years as precision-guided munitions and area-effect weapons have turned "quantity" from a battle-winning advantage to simply the crowding of more targets into a kill zone. Yet, while land warfare and naval surface combat are seeing quality becoming ascendant over quantity, the undersea warfare market is moving in the opposite direction. No advanced or expensive platform is required to fire a modern homing torpedo, yet an under-the-keel hit from that torpedo will kill a large and sophisticated target, such as a DDG-51 class destroyer or a Littoral Combat Ship. Because the launch platform is basic and inexpensive, it can be purchased in large quantities. Thus, the chance of getting in a lethal shot is increased. The submarine that sank the South Korean corvette Cheonan was a small, very inexpensive coastal submarine whose design and characteristics would not have been out of place in 1917. Even the loss of several such small submarines would have been a profitable exchange for killing a modem destroyer or frigate. This highlighted the fact that submarines are simply too effective as ship killers for their abilities to go unchallenged. With the sinking of the Cheonan, a new undersea enemy entered the arena, and it is likely that the next decade will see the response being expressed in increased procurement and research funding. Navies that pursue ASW on a serious basis (a small proportion of the total) have concentrated their attention on the top end of the threat. With the focus on sophisticated and highly capable SSNs, the threat posed by small coastal submarines has been neglected. The sudden arrival of the small coastal submarine armed with exceptionally lethal weapons raises new questions that the existing undersea warfare market is not well-equipped to answer. Ironically, warships from the 1940s and 1950s would have been better equipped to handle this threat than their modern equivalents. Their arrays of depth charges and ahead-throwing mortars would have been of greater value than the weapons carried by modern submarine hunters. This may cause a reassessment of priorities and a change in direction of R&D efforts. Thus, there exists a fundamental conflict between the need to develop new technology in order to ensure that military capabilities remain uncompromised and the lack of the financial resources necessary to deploy that new technology. The most common answer to this dilemma has been to develop equipment but not transit the new systems through to the production stage or, alternatively, to only produce the new equipment in small numbers for issue when and where circumstances demand. In many ways, the current forecast period is seeing undersea warfare marking time while a new generation of systems is developed and a new threat evolves to justify their production. The motto for undersea warfare at present may well be research for development rather than research and development. With the abrupt change in the threat profile, this long period of marking time may be about to end, however. A Sense of Direction? The undersea warfare market palpably lacks a sense of purpose and direction. The current strategic environment is centered on the Western world's attempts to defend itself against attacks from Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. These are non-state players -however much they may depend on supportive national entities - and do not have the organized military forces conventionally associated with war-making bodies. Indeed, experience has shown that such forces are quickly crushed when they are faced with a regular army. The caveat here is that modern industrial techniques mean that the kind of primitive coastal submarine that sank the Cheonan is well within the reach of non-state players. The problem for undersea warfare is that those non-state players do not deploy navies and apparently have no intention of doing so. However, they have created a substitute in the form of an explosive revival of piracy. Attacks on merchant ships and holding them and their crews for ransom are substitutes for naval power. While the age-old task of escorting merchantmen through pirate-infested waters is a lifeline of relevance for many navies, it does nothing for the undersea warfare market. While anti-submarine warfare is, to some extent, groping for a role, mine warfare is a different matter. The threat of the terrorist mine has disturbing potential, and the prospect for countermeasures can be very bright for companies that orient their research and development properly. While operating submarines is far outside the abilities of a terrorist group, laying mines in shipping lanes is an entirely practical option. Such mines could be simple (or improvised) contact mines but could also be sophisticated influence mines. Each will require its own set of countermeasures. If the various terrorist groups develop a maritime awareness, mine warfare is likely to be their first resort. This suggests that the undersea warfare market will undergo a realignment in which offensive and defensive anti-submarine warfare will be de-emphasized in favor of mine warfare. If the threat of terrorist mining becomes real, navies will either require more sophisticated mine warfare ships or adopt a totally new approach to the conundrum. What may apply here is the developing concept of organic mine warfare - that is, equipping general-purpose warships for mine clearance roles rather than delegating that task to specialized mine warfare ships. This is likely to be the major theme of mine warfare over the next decade. The existing generation of highly specialized minehunters using elaborate and costly equipment will be replaced by a new generation of standoff techniques that can speed clearance rates while greatly reducing the risks to clearance platforms. This switch to standoff mine countermeasures technology highlights a problem that faces all participants in undersea warfare. Such technology involves far more than just buying the necessary equipment. The technology requires a major commitment to training and an infrastructure commitment of enormous proportions. There is a deeply worrying side to this situation. Development and production capabilities are the product of time, of accumulated expertise, and of institutional memories that are quick to decay from disuse. If undersea warfare skills and production capabilities are allowed to atrophy, the costs incurred in rebuilding them when they are needed may be high indeed. In this environment, the sinking of the Cheonan was a wake-up call. The corvette was not a major vessel, and it did not represent a major element of fighting power. It was specifically designed to provide a naval presence at low cost. But that need not have been the case. The equipment and techniques used to sink her would have worked just as well against a large, modern missile destroyer or a major amphibious warfare ship. In the latter case - a torpedo hit on an amphibious warfare ship loaded with marines - the death toll would have been at least a magnitude greater than the 46 sailors lost on the Cheonan. The truth was that the undersea warfare assets deployed in that case were inadequate to detect the ambush or to counter the torpedo when it was on its way. Perhaps this incident will result in renewed emphasis on the currently embattled area of undersea warfare.

机译：战争中有一个古老的原则，即“数量本身具有质量”。近年来，随着精确制导的弹药和面效应武器将“数量”从赢得战斗的优势变成简单地将更多目标拥挤成杀伤区，这种格言的准确性变得越来越令人怀疑。然而，尽管陆战和海面战斗的质量已超过数量，但海底战市场却朝着相反的方向发展。无需使用先进或昂贵的平台即可发射现代制导的鱼雷，但是从鱼雷的龙骨下击中会杀死大型而复杂的目标，例如DDG-51级驱逐舰或沿海战斗舰。由于启动平台是基本且廉价的，因此可以大量购买。因此，增加了致命击球的机会。沉没在韩国轻巡洋舰天安号上的潜艇是一艘小型，非常便宜的沿海潜艇，其设计和特征在1917年就不会过时。即使损失几艘这样的小型潜艇，对于杀死一艘现代驱逐舰来说也是一笔有利可图的交易。或护卫舰这凸显了这样一个事实，即潜艇作为杀手舰实在太强大了，以至于它们的能力不受挑战。随着天安号的沉没，一个新的海底敌人进入了战场，未来十年很可能会看到增加采购和研究经费的反应。认真追求反潜的海军（占总数的一小部分）将注意力集中在威胁的最高端。由于侧重于复杂和功能强大的SSN，因此小型沿海潜艇带来的威胁已被忽略。带有特殊杀伤性武器的小型沿海潜水艇的突然到来提出了新的问题，即现有的海底战争市场没有足够的装备来回答。具有讽刺意味的是，与现代同类产品相比，1940年代和1950年代的军舰本应能更好地应对这种威胁。与现代潜艇猎人所携带的武器相比，他们一系列的深度炸药和投掷的迫击炮将具有更大的价值。这可能会导致重新评估优先级，并改变研发工作的方向。因此，在开发新技术以确保军事能力不受影响的需求与缺乏部署该新技术所需的财政资源之间存在根本冲突。解决此难题的最常见答案是开发设备，但不将新系统转移到生产阶段，或者仅少量生产新设备，以在需要时和需要的地方发出。从许多方面来看，当前的预测期是海底战争打标的时间，同时开发了新一代系统，并出现了新的威胁以证明其生产合理。目前，海底战争的座右铭很可能是研究促进发展，而不是研究与发展。但是，随着威胁状况的突然变化，这种较长的标记时间可能即将结束。有方向感吗？海底战争市场显然缺乏目标感和方向感。当前的战略环境以西方世界为抵御伊斯兰原教旨主义恐怖分子的袭击而进行的努力为中心。这些是非国家参与者-但是它们可能取决于支持性的国家实体-并且没有通常与战争组织有联系的有组织的军事力量。确实，经验表明，这些部队在遇到正规部队时会迅速被击碎。需要说明的是，现代工业技术意味着沉没天安舰的原始沿海潜水艇完全处于非国有企业的能力范围之内。海底战争的问题在于，那些非国家玩家不会部署海军，而且显然无意这样做。但是，他们以盗版的爆炸式复兴形式创建了替代品。攻击商船并扣押他们及其船员索要赎金是海军的替代品。虽然护航商人通过海盗出没的水域是一项古老的任务，对许多海军来说，这是一条至关重要的生命线，但对海底战争市场却无济于事。虽然反潜战在某种程度上正在寻求一种作用，但地雷战却是另一回事。恐怖地雷的威胁具有令人不安的潜力，对于正确确定研发方向的公司，对策的前景可能非常光明。虽然操作潜艇远远超出了恐怖组织的能力，在航道上铺设地雷是一种完全可行的选择。这样的地雷可以是简单的（或临时的）接触式地雷，也可以是复杂的影响力地雷。每个国家都需要一套自己的对策。如果各种恐怖组织发展了海上意识，则地雷战争很可能是他们的第一选择。这表明海底战争市场将进行重组，将不再强调进攻性和防御性的反潜战争，而转向地雷。如果恐怖袭击的威胁成为现实，海军将需要更先进的地雷战舰，或采用全新的方法来解决这一难题。这里可能适用的是有机地雷作战的发展概念，即为扫雷角色配备通用军舰，而不是将任务委托给专门的地雷战舰。这可能是未来十年地雷战的主要主题。现有的使用精巧而昂贵的设备的高度专业化的矿工猎人将被新一代的防区外技术所取代，该技术可加快通关速度，同时大大降低通关平台的风险。转换为对峙地雷对策技术突显了海底战争中所有参与者都面临的问题。这样的技术所涉及的不仅仅是购买必要的设备。该技术需要对培训的主要承诺和对基础设施的巨大承诺。这种情况有令人深感担忧的一面。开发和生产能力是时间，积累的专业知识以及因使用而迅速消失的机构记忆的产物。如果允许海底作战技能和生产能力萎缩，那么在需要时重建它们的成本可能确实很高。在这种环境下，天安号沉没是一个警钟。巡洋舰不是主要船只，它也不是战斗力的主要组成部分。它是专门为以低成本提供海军存在而设计的。但这不是必须的。用于沉没她的设备和技术在大型现代化导弹驱逐舰或大型两栖战舰上的效果也一样。在后一种情况下-鱼雷击中了装满海军陆战队的两栖战舰-造成的死亡人数至少比在天安舰上丧生的46名水手要大。事实是，在这种情况下部署的海底战争资产不足以侦察伏击或在鱼雷行进时抵抗鱼雷。也许这一事件将导致人们重新强调目前陷入困境的海底战争地区。

The Market for Undersea Warfare Systems

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