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Platform externalities and the antitrust case against Microsoft

机译：平台外部性和针对Microsoft的反托拉斯案

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摘要

In the recent antitrust case against Microsoft, the presiding district court judge and the federal appeals court did indeed find that a market for operating systems software exists, that Microsoft possesses a monopoly in that market, and that the company used its monopoly position to harm consumers. The question raised here is whether the analysis used to support the judge's finding of fact is relevant in a market dominated by an industry platform. In markets where platforms provide an important role in coordinating the actions of competitors, the existence of a single platform increases rather than reduces economic efficiency. A single platform enhances social welfare through the creation of positive externalities identified as family effects. It has been argued that Microsoft is entitled to a share of these benefits given its role as the creator of the technology underlying the Windows platform. Applying the Coase theorem, the distribution of these benefits is something that is worked out between competitors and in the absence of transaction costs, does not require government intervention. Such payments not only provide the basis for achieving an efficient allocation among parties, but also provide an incentive for innovation. This innovation is not directed toward finding a substitute for the existing Windows platform but rather is designed to minimize its importance in an effort to make it irrelevant for the next generation of computing. By changing the terms of competition, firms are in a better position to gain a sizable share of an expanded market and appropriate a greater portion of the social benefits created from a new platform.
机译：在最近针对微软的反托拉斯案中，地方法院首席法官和联邦上诉法院确实确实存在操作系统软件的市场，微软在该市场中拥有垄断地位，并且该公司利用其垄断地位伤害了消费者。 。这里提出的问题是，用于支持法官的事实认定的分析在以行业平台为主导的市场中是否相关。在平台在协调竞争对手行动中发挥重要作用的市场中，单个平台的存在会增加而不是降低经济效率。一个单一的平台通过创建被确认为家庭效应的积极外部性来增强社会福利。有人认为，鉴于Microsoft作为Windows平台基础技术的创建者，因此有权获得这些好处的一部分。应用科斯定理，这些收益的分配是在竞争者之间进行的，并且在没有交易成本的情况下，不需要政府干预。此类付款不仅为在各方之间实现有效分配提供了基础，而且还为创新提供了动力。此项创新并非旨在寻找现有Windows平台的替代品，而是旨在最大程度地降低其重要性，以使其与下一代计算无关。通过改变竞争条件，企业可以更好地获得扩展市场的可观份额，并利用新平台所创造的更大的社会效益。

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  • 来源
    《The Antitrust Bulletin》 |2002年第4期|p.641-660|共20页
  • 作者

    NEIL B. NIMAN;

  • 作者单位

    Economics, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 经济;
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