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首页> 外文期刊>Applied Mathematical Modelling >Dynamic procurement management by reverse auctions with fixed setup costs and sales levers
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Dynamic procurement management by reverse auctions with fixed setup costs and sales levers

机译：通过固定设置成本和销售杠杆的反向拍卖进行动态采购管理

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In this paper, we study a dynamic procurement problem for a retailer with fixed setup costs and sales levers (such as pricing, advertising, etc.). The retailer runs a reverse auction with a procurement contract in each period. A number of potential suppliers bid for this contract, and the winner is the supplier with the highest bid and is given the decision right for the quantity produced and delivered. The demand is either realized by selling via Internet auctions and unmet demand is lost, or is a price-sensitive nonnegative random variable and all shortages are backlogged. We show the existence of the retailer's optimal procurement contract, under which the suppliers' Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bidding strategy is (q(•), Q(•)), similar to the classic (s, S) policy for the retailers in dynamic inventory control problems. However, the (q(•). Q(•)) strategy here is for the suppliers and is realized through the suppliers' marginal production costs and so consists of two random variables for the retailer.
机译：在本文中，我们研究了具有固定设置成本和销售杠杆（例如定价，广告等）的零售商的动态采购问题。零售商在每个时期都要进行带有采购合同的反向拍卖。许多潜在的供应商竞标该合同，而中标者是出价最高的供应商，并具有生产和交付数量的决定权。需求要么通过通过互联网拍卖进行销售而实现，但需求缺口消失了，或者是价格敏感的非负随机变量，所有短缺都被积压。我们展示了零售商的最优采购合同的存在，在该合同下，供应商的贝叶斯-纳什均衡竞标策略为（q（•），Q（•）），类似于动态中零售商的经典（s，S）策略库存控制问题。但是，这里的（q（•）。Q（•））策略是针对供应商的，它是通过供应商的边际生产成本实现的，因此由零售商的两个随机变量组成。

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