...
首页> 外文期刊>Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies >Dark Side of Institutional Shareholder Activism in Emerging Markets: Evidence from China’s Split Share Structure Reform
【24h】

Dark Side of Institutional Shareholder Activism in Emerging Markets: Evidence from China’s Split Share Structure Reform

机译:新兴市场中机构股东激进主义的阴暗面:来自中国股权分置改革的证据

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

This study aims to investigate the role that institutional investors played exploiting the split share structure reform launched in 2005 in China. Since that time, non-tradable majority shareholders have had to compensate minority tradable shareholders to obtain the rights to transfer their shares in the capital markets. The compensation ratio proposed by non-tradable majority shareholders needs to be approved in at least two-thirds of the votes cast by tradable shareholders, among which the most powerful are the institutional investors. Our study finds that institutional investors actively participate in voting, but their activism is beneficial to majority shareholders rather than minority shareholders. Specifically, we find a significant negative relation between institutional shareholdings and (i) the initial compensation ratio, (ii) the probability and amount of the upward revision of the initial compensation ratio during the bargaining process, and (iii) the final compensation ratio. Collectively, our results suggest that institutional shareholders are more likely to collude rather than fight with controlling shareholders in emerging markets where investor protection is weak.
机译:本研究旨在调查机构投资者在利用2005年在中国启动的股权分置改革中发挥的作用。从那时起,非流通大股东不得不补偿少数流通股东,以获得在资本市场上转让其股份的权利。非流通大股东提议的薪酬比例至少需要流通股东投票的三分之二才能通过,其中最有影响力的是机构投资者。我们的研究发现,机构投资者积极参与投票,但他们的积极性对大股东而非小股东有利。具体而言,我们发现机构持股与(i)初始补偿率,(ii)在议价过程中向上修正初始补偿率的可能性和金额以及(iii)最终补偿率之间存在显着的负相关关系。总体而言,我们的结果表明,在投资者保护薄弱的新兴市场中,机构股东更有可能串通而不是与控股股东抗争。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号