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Relative Responsiveness of Bargaining Solutions to Changes in Status-quo Payoffs

机译：议价解决方案对现状收益变化的相对响应

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摘要

It is a well-known fact that several prominent bargaining solutions are responsive to changes in status-quo (i.e., disagreement or fallback) payoffs. When an agent's status-quo payoff increases, his solution payoff either stays the same or increases. A fully general result for these solutions' status-quo point ranking is impossible to establish. In this paper, using an important class of bargaining problems, a ranking of the relative status-quo point responsiveness of prominent bargaining solutions is obtained. Using the Constant Elasticity of Substitution class of bargaining problems, regardless of the concavity of the Pareto frontier and the level of increase in one's status-quo payoff, we find the equal gains solution is the most responsive with respect to changes in status-quo payoffs, followed by the Nash solution. The equal sacrifice solutions is the least responsive, followed by the Kalai/ Smorodinsky solution.
机译：众所周知的事实是，一些著名的讨价还价解决方案对现状（即，分歧或后备）收益的变化做出了响应。当业务代表的现状收益增加时，其解决方案收益将保持不变或增加。这些解决方案的现状点排名无法获得完全通用的结果。在本文中，使用一类重要的讨价还价问题，对著名的讨价还价解决方案的相对现状点响应度进行了排名。使用讨价还价问题的不变弹性替代类别，无论帕累托边界是凹面还是个人收益的增加水平，我们发现就收益的变化而言，均等收益解决方案是最敏感的，然后是Nash解决方案。平等牺牲的解决方案反应最快，其次是Kalai / Smorodinsky解决方案。

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