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The Link Between CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: Does Simultaneity Matter?

机译:CEO薪酬与公司绩效之间的联系:同时性很重要吗?

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摘要

In order to combat the principle-agent problem, directors of public companies use incentive-based contracts to align the interests of CEOs and shareholders. Some studies suggest that these contracts are an inefficient use of resources, and that they do not motivate CEOs to do what is best for the firm. In this study, the author estimates a regression to find the relationship between CEO Compensation and market value of a firm. In order to address persistence, endogeneity and firm-specific effects the author uses the first-differenced and system GMM regression techniques first used by [Arellano, M.; Bover, O. "Another Look at the Instrumental-Variable Estimation of Error-Component Models," Journal of Econometrics, 68, 1995, pp. 29-51] and [Blundell, R. W.; Bonds, S. R. "Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models," Journal of Econometrics, 87, 1998, pp. 115-43; Blundell, R. W.; Bond, S. R., Windmeijer, F. "Estimation in Dynamic Panel Data Models: Improving on the Performance of the Standard GMM Estimators," Institute for Fiscal Studies Working Paper W00/12, London, England, 2000]. These regressions report a positive relationship between CEO compensation and market value of a firm. This study concludes that incentive based contracts are effective, due to the positive pay-to-performance link, when controlling for simultaneity.
机译:为了解决委托代理问题,上市公司的董事使用基于激励的合同来调整首席执行官和股东的利益。一些研究表明,这些合同对资源的利用效率低下,并且它们不会激励CEO做出对公司最有利的事情。在这项研究中,作者估计了回归,以发现首席执行官薪酬与公司市场价值之间的关系。为了解决持久性,内生性和公司特有的影响,作者使用了[Arellano,M .; Bover,O.“另一种看误差分量模型的工具变量估计”,《计量经济学杂志》,第68卷,1995年,第29-51页]和[Blundell,R。W. Bonds,S.R。,“动态面板数据模型中的初始条件和力矩限制”,《计量经济学杂志》,87,1998年,第115-43页。 R.W.Blundell; Bond,S。R.,Windmeijer,F。“动态面板数据模型中的估计:改进了GMM估计器的性能”,财政研究所工作论文W00 / 12,英国伦敦,2000年。这些回归表明首席执行官薪酬与公司市场价值之间存在正相关关系。这项研究得出的结论是,在控制同时性时,由于积极的薪酬与绩效挂钩,基于激励的合同是有效的。

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