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The Effect of Corporate Governance on Auditor-Client Realignments

机译：公司治理对审计师与客户重组的影响

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Events leading up to the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) increased the public's focus on corporate governance and increased regulatory scrutiny of corporate governance mechanisms. These events also contributed to a massive restructuring in the audit market that resulted in the transfer of a large number of clients from Big N to non-Big N audit firms. We extend prior research examining the determinants of auditor-client realignments by investigating the effect of corporate governance on downward (i.e., from Big N to non-Big N auditors) switching activity. We develop a corporate governance index comprised of governance characteristics that we expect auditors to find more desirable in their clients (specifically, board and audit committee independence, diligence, and expertise). The results suggest that Big N auditors consider client corporate governance mechanisms when making client portfolio decisions. Specifically, downward auditor-client realignments are more likely for clients that score lower on our corporate governance index. However, the influence of audit committee-related corporate governance components on downward auditor-client realignments decreased post-SOX. The reduced effect of audit committee-related corporate governance components is consistent with what would be expected if the audit committee-related rules imposed by SOX reduced the variation in audit committee quality across clients.
机译：导致实施2002年《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》（SOX）的事件增加了公众对公司治理的关注，并加强了对公司治理机制的监管审查。这些事件还导致了审计市场的大规模重组，导致大量客户从Big N转移到非Big N审计事务所。我们通过调查公司治理对向下（即从大N型审计师到非大N型审计师）转换活动的影响，扩展了检查审计师与客户重组决定因素的先前研究。我们开发了由治理特征组成的公司治理指数，我们希望审计师在其客户中找到更理想的选择（特别是董事会和审计委员会的独立性，勤奋和专业知识）。结果表明，Big N审计师在制定客户投资组合决策时会考虑客户公司治理机制。具体而言，对于在公司治理指数中得分较低的客户，审计师与客户的向下调整更可能发生。但是，与审核委员会相关的公司治理组件对向下的审核员与客户重组的影响有所下降。与审核委员会相关的公司治理组件的降低的影响与如果SOX实施的与审核委员会相关的规则减少了客户之间的审核委员会质量的差异所预期的结果是一致的。

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