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Person as scientist, person as moralist

机译：作为科学家的人，作为道德主义者的人

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It has often been suggested that people's ordinary capacities for understanding the world make use of much the same methods one might find in a formal scientific investigation. A series of recent experimental results offer a challenge to this widely-held view, suggesting that people's moral judgments can actually influence the intuitions they hold both in folk psychology and in causal cognition. The present target article distinguishes two basic approaches to explaining such effects. One approach would be to say that the relevant competencies are entirely non-moral but that some additional factor (conversational pragmatics, performance error, etc.) then interferes and allows people's moral judgments to affect their intuitions. Another approach would be to say that moral considerations truly do figure in workings of the competencies themselves. I argue that the data available now favor the second of these approaches over the first.
机译：人们通常建议人们了解世界的一般能力使用的是与正式科学调查中发现的方法几乎相同的方法。最近的一系列实验结果对这一广为流传的观点提出了挑战，表明人们的道德判断实际上可以影响他们在民间心理学和因果认知方面的直觉。本目标文章区分了两种基本方法来解释这种效果。一种方法是说相关能力完全是非道德的，但是某些其他因素（会话语用，绩效错误等）会干扰并允许人们的道德判断影响他们的直觉。另一种方法是说，道德考量确实在能力本身的运作中起作用。我认为现在可用的数据优先于第一种方法。

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