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How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition

机译：我们如何认识自己的思想：心智理解与元认知之间的关系

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Four different accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of them endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. Section 1 of this target article introduces the four accounts. Section 2 develops the "mindreading is prior" model in more detail, showing how it predicts introspection for perceptual and quasi-perceptual (e.g., imagistic) mental events while claiming that metacognitive access to our own attitudes always results from swift unconscious self-interpretation. This section also considers the model's relationship to the expression of attitudes in speech. Section 3 argues that the commonsense belief in the existence of introspection should be given no weight. Section 4 argues briefly that data from childhood development are of no help in resolving this debate. Section 5 considers the evolutionary claims to which the different accounts are committed, and argues that the three introspective views make predictions that are not borne out by the data. Section 6 examines the extensive evidence that people often confabulate when self-attributing attitudes. Section 7 considers "two systems" accounts of human thinking and reasoning, arguing that although there are introspectable events within System 2, there are no introspectable attitudes. Section 8 examines alleged evidence of "unsymbolized thinking". Section 9 considers the claim that schizophrenia exhibits a dissociation between mindreading and metacognition. Finally, section 10 evaluates the claim that autism presents a dissociation in the opposite direction, of metacognition without mindreading.
机译：比较和评估了第三人称阅读与第一人称元认知之间关系的四种不同说法。尽管其中三个支持对命题态度的内省，但是第四个（在此捍卫）主张我们对自己态度的了解是由于将思考能力转向了自己。本目标文章的第1节介绍了这四个帐户。第2节更详细地发展了“先于思想”模式，展示了它如何预测对感性和准感性（例如幻想）精神事件的内省，同时声称对我们自己态度的元认知途径总是来自迅速的无意识自我解释。本节还考虑了模型与语音态度表达的关系。第三节认为，对内省存在的常识性信念不应给予任何重视。第四部分简要地论证了儿童期发展的数据对解决这一争论没有帮助。第5节考虑了不同账户所遵循的进化论主张，并认为三种内省的观点做出的预测并没有被数据证实。第6节研究了广泛的证据，这些证据表明人们在自我推崇态度时常常会捏造。第7节考虑了人类思维和推理的“两个系统”，认为尽管系统2中存在内省事件，但没有内省态度。第8节审查了所谓的“象征性思维”的证据。第9节认为，精神分裂症表现出思维和元认知之间的分离。最后，第10节评估了自闭症在与元认知相反的方向上解脱的主张，而无需进行心思阅读。

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