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When Does Policy Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence

机译：政策改革何时生效？中央银行独立案

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Questions of the effectiveness of economic policy reform are inseparable from the political economy factors responsible for distortionary policies in the first place. Distortionary policies are more likely to be adopted where politicians face fewer constraints. Hence reform should have modest effects in societies where the political system already imposes strong constraints, and in societies with weak constraints, because it does not alter the underlying political economy. Reform should be most effective in societies with intermediate constraints. Furthermore, effective reform in one dimension may lead to deterioration in others, as politicians address the underlying demands through other means-a phenomenon we call the seesaw effect. We report evidence that central bank reforms reduced inflation in countries with intermediate constraints but had no or little effect where constraints were strong or weak. We also present evidence consistent with the seesaw effect: in countries where central bank reform reduces inflation, government expenditure tends to increase.
机译：经济政策改革的有效性问题首先与造成扭曲政策的政治经济因素密不可分。在政客面临较少限制的情况下，更可能采用扭曲政策。因此，改革应该在政治制度已经强加约束的社会中以及在弱约束的社会中产生适度的影响，因为它不会改变潜在的政治经济。在存在中间限制的社会中，改革应该是最有效的。此外，在一个方面进行有效的改革可能会导致其他方面的恶化，因为政客们会通过其他方式解决潜在的需求，这种现象我们称为跷跷板效应。我们报告的证据表明，在具有中等约束条件的国家中，中央银行的改革降低了通货膨胀率，但在约束条件强弱的情况下，则没有或几乎没有效果。我们还提供了与跷跷板效应相符的证据：在中央银行改革降低通货膨胀的国家中，政府支出趋于增加。

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