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Rules of the game: whose value is served when the board fires the owners?

机译:游戏规则:当董事会解雇所有人时,其价值是谁?

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摘要

How does a board of directors decide what is right? The contest over this question is frequently framed as a debate between shareholder value and stakeholder rights, between a utilitarian view of the ethics of corporate governance and a deontological one. This paper uses a case study with special circumstances that allows us to examine in an unusually clear way the conflict between shareholder value and other bases on which a board can act. In the autumn of 2010, the board of Liverpool Football Club sold the company to another investing group against the explicit wishes of the owners. The peculiar circumstances of this case provide insight into the conflict between ethical approaches to board decisions, allowing us to see certain issues more clearly than we can in listed corporations with many shareholders. What the analysis suggests is that the board saw more than one type of utility on which to base its ethical decision, and that one version resonated with perceived duties to stakeholders. This alignment of outcomes of strategic value with duties contrasted with the utility of shareholder value. While there are reasons to be cautious in generalizing, the case further suggests reasons why boards may reject shareholder value, in opposition to mainstream notions of corporate governance, without rejecting utility as a base of their decisions. Further, the partial alignment of duty and utility facilitates a pragmatic decision rather than one based on a priori claims.
机译:董事会如何决定什么是对的?关于这个问题的争论通常被认为是在股东价值和利益相关者权利之间,在对公司治理伦理的功利主义观点与对义务论的争论之间进行的辩论。本文使用了一种特殊情况下的案例研究,使我们能够以异常清晰的方式研究股东价值与董事会可以采取行动的其他基础之间的冲突。在2010年秋天,利物浦足球俱乐部董事会违反了业主的明确意愿将公司出售给了另一个投资集团。这种情况的特殊情况使我们对董事会决策的道德方法之间的冲突有了更深入的了解,这使我们比在拥有许多股东的上市公司中更清楚地看到某些问题。分析表明,董事会看到了不止一种类型的效用可作为其道德决策的基础,并且一种形式引起了利益相关者的责任。战略价值与职责的结果一致与股东价值的效用形成对比。尽管有一些谨慎的概括理由,但此案还进一步说明了董事会可能拒绝股东价值的原因,这与公司治理的主流观念相反,而不是拒绝将效用作为其决策的基础。此外,职责和效用的部分一致有助于一种务实的决定,而不是基于在先权利要求的决定。

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  • 来源
    《Business Ethics》 |2012年第3期|p.298-309|共12页
  • 作者

    Donald Nordberg;

  • 作者单位

    University of Westminster and City University, London, UK;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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