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Bluff to peace: How economic dependence promotes peace despite increasing deception and uncertainty

机译：尽管提高了欺骗和不确定性，但是，尽管增加了欺骗和不确定性，但经济依赖性如何促进和平

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Trade-conflict studies have shown that economic dependence can promote peace by costly signaling resolve. However, with higher economic integration, targets also become more vulnerable to coercion and potential challengers are incentivized to bluff. In return, target states may resist more, raising the question of whether trade still promotes peace. I theorize that bluffing does not stoke conflict in this context because the bargaining environment allows states to inform and coerce simultaneously: the factor that renders a threat less credible also restrains states from further escalation. I test this theory's implications with a structural estimation method and find supporting results.
机译：贸易冲突研究表明，经济依赖可以通过昂贵的发信号传统来促进和平。然而，随着更高的经济一体化，目标也变得更容易受到胁迫，潜在的挑战者被激活到虚张声势。作为回报，目标国家可能抵制更多，提出贸易是否仍会促进和平的问题。我理解虚张声势不会在这种情况下扼杀冲突，因为讨价还价的环境允许各国同时通知和强迫：赋予威胁不那么可信的因素也限制了各国从进一步的升级中抑制了各国。我测试这个理论的结构估计方法并找到支持结果。

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