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Scoring rules and abnormally low bids criteria in construction tenders: a taxonomic review

机译:建筑招标中的评分规则和异常低的投标标准:分类学评论

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In the global construction context, the best value or most economically advantageous tender is becoming a widespread approach for contractor selection, as an alternative to other traditional awarding criteria such as the lowest price. In these multi-attribute tenders, the owner or auctioneer solicits proposals containing both a price bid and additional technical features. Once the proposals are received, each bidder's price bid is given an economic score according to a scoring rule, generally called an economic scoring formula (ESF) and a technical score according to pre-specified criteria. Eventually, the contract is awarded to the bidder with the highest weighted overall score (economic + technical). However, economic scoring formula selection by auctioneers is invariably and paradoxically a highly intuitive process in practice, involving few theoretical or empirical considerations, despite having been considered traditionally and mistakenly as objective, due to its mathematical nature. This paper provides a taxonomic classification of a wide variety of ESFs and abnormally low bids criteria (ALBC) gathered in several countries with different tendering approaches. Practical implications concern the optimal design of price scoring rules in construction contract tenders, as well as future analyses of the effects of the ESF and ALBC on competitive bidding behaviour.
机译:在全球建设的背景下,最具价值或最具经济优势的招标正成为承包商选择的一种普遍方法,作为对其他传统授标标准(例如最低价格)的替代。在这些多属性投标中,所有者或拍卖人征求包含价格投标和其他技术特征的投标。收到建议后,将根据计分规则(通常称为经济计分公式(ESF))为每个投标人的价格竞标提供经济得分,并根据预先指定的标准给其技术得分。最终,合同被授予最高加权总分(经济+技术)的投标人。然而,尽管由于传统上被错误地认为是客观的,但由于其数学性质,拍卖师在经济上评分公式的选择在实践中始终是一个矛盾的过程,几乎没有理论或经验上的考虑。本文提供了多种ESF的分类学分类,以及在几个采用不同招标方法的国家/地区收集的异常低标价标准(ALBC)。实际含义涉及建筑合同招标中价格评分规则的最佳设计,以及ESF和ALBC对竞争性投标行为的影响的未来分析。

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