...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Construction Management and Economics >Interpreting risk allocation mechanism in public-private partnership projects: an empirical study in a transaction cost economics perspective
【24h】

Interpreting risk allocation mechanism in public-private partnership projects: an empirical study in a transaction cost economics perspective

机译：解释公私伙伴关系项目中的风险分配机制：交易成本经济学视角的实证研究

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Risk allocation in public-private partnership (PPP) projects is currently claimed as capability driven. While lacking theoretical support, the claim is often 'violated' by current industrial practice. There is thus a need for formal mechanisms to interpret why a particular risk is retained by government in one project while transferred to private partners in another. From the viewpoint of transaction cost economics (TCE), integrated with the resource-based view (RBV) of organizational capabilities, this paper proposed a theoretical framework for understanding risk allocation practice in PPP projects. The theories underlying the major constructs and their links were articulated. Data gathered from an industry-wide survey were used to test the framework. The results of multiple linear regression (MLR) generally support the proposed framework. It has been found that partners' risk management routine, mechanism, commitment, cooperation history, and uncertainties associated with project risk management could serve to determine the risk allocation strategies adopted in a PPP project. This theoretical framework thus provides both government and private agencies with a logical and complete understanding of the process of selecting the allocation strategy for a particular risk in PPP projects. Moreover, it could be utilized to steer the risk allocation strategy by controlling certain critical determinants identified in the study. Study limitations and future research directions have also been set out.
机译：目前，公私伙伴关系（PPP）项目中的风险分配被认为是能力驱动的。尽管缺乏理论支持，但该主张经常被当前的工业实践“违反”。因此，需要一种正式的机制来解释为什么在一个项目中政府保留了特定风险而又将风险转移给了另一个项目中的私人伙伴。从交易成本经济学（TCE）的角度出发，结合组织能力的基于资源的观点（RBV），本文提出了一个理解PPP项目风险分配实践的理论框架。阐明了主要构架及其联系的基础理论。从整个行业的调查中收集的数据用于测试框架。多元线性回归（MLR）的结果通常支持所提出的框架。已经发现，合作伙伴的风险管理程序，机制，承诺，合作历史以及与项目风险管理相关的不确定性可以用来确定PPP项目中采用的风险分配策略。因此，该理论框架为政府和私人机构提供了对PPP项目中特定风险选择分配策略的过程的逻辑和完整的理解。此外，它可以通过控制研究中确定的某些关键决定因素来指导风险分配策略。研究的局限性和未来的研究方向也已经确定。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号