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Alternative Internal Controls as Substitutes of the Board of Directors

机译：替代内部控制作为董事会的替代品

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摘要

Empirical literature on corporate governance often assumes independence among different control mechanisms. However, different studies in the Anglo-Saxon context find that control mechanisms are interrelated. The Spanish corporate governance system, unlike the Anglo-Saxon one, is characterised by the dominance of internal controls, mainly the stock ownership concentration and the board of directors. In this internal control context, we specifically analyse the possible substitution of the supervisory potential of the board outsiders by the incentive effects derived from managerial stock ownership and the supervisory role of large shareholders. Our main results show a negative relationship between the proportion of outside directors and managerial and large blockholders' ownership stake. These findings support the substitution among internal controls and suggest that Spanish firms form an efficient conglomerate of managerial controls, in which deficiencies in a single mechanism can be compensated by the action of an alternative one.
机译：关于公司治理的经验文献通常假设不同控制机制之间具有独立性。但是，盎格鲁撒克逊语境下的不同研究发现，控制机制是相互关联的。西班牙公司治理体系与盎格鲁撒克逊体系不同，其特点是内部控制占主导地位，主要是股权集中度和董事会。在这种内部控制的背景下，我们专门分析了由管理层持股和大股东的监督作用所产生的激励效应可能替代董事会外部人的监督潜力。我们的主要结果表明，外部董事的比​​例与管理层和大股东的持股比例之间存在负相关关系。这些发现支持内部控制之间的替代，并表明西班牙公司组成了一个有效的管理控制集团，其中单一机制的缺陷可以通过替代机制的行动来弥补。

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