• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Decision Sciences >Do Shareholders Really Prefer Their Executives to Maximize the Equity Value? A Newsvendor Case
【24h】

Do Shareholders Really Prefer Their Executives to Maximize the Equity Value? A Newsvendor Case

机译：股东是否真的更喜欢他们的高管，以实现股权价值的最大化？报童案

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

In this article, we study how the operational decisions of a firm manager depend on her own incentives, the capital structure, and financial decisions in the context of the newsvendor framework. We establish a relationship between the firm's cost of raising funds and the riskiness of the inventory decisions of the manager. We consider four types of managers, namely, profit, equity, firm value, and profit-equity maximizers, and initially assume that they may raise funds to increase the inventory level only by issuing debt. We show that the shareholders are indifferent between the different types of managers when the coefficient of variation (CV) of demand is low. However, this is not the case when the CV of demand is high. Based on the demand and the firm's specific characteristics such as profitability, leverage, and bankruptcy costs, the shareholders might be better off with the manager whose compensation package is tied to the firm value as opposed to the equity value. We, then, extend our model by allowing the manager to raise the required funds by issuing both debt and equity. For this case we focus on the equity and firm value maximizer managers and show that our earlier results (for the debt only case) still hold subject to the cost of issuing equity. However the benefit of the firm value maximizer manager over the equity maximizer manager for shareholders is considerably less in this case compared to the case where the manager can only issue debt. The Board of Directors can take these factors into consideration when establishing/modifying the right incentive package for the managers. We also incorporate the notion of the asymmetric information to capture its impact on the board of directors' decision about the managers' incentive package. [Submitted: June 13,2010. Revised: November 29, 2010; June 15, 2011. Accepted: August 16, 2011.]
机译：在本文中，我们研究在新闻供应商框架的背景下，公司经理的经营决策如何取决于她自己的激励，资本结构和财务决策。我们在公司筹集资金的成本与经理的库存决定的风险之间建立了关系。我们考虑了四种类型的经理，即利润，股权，公司价值和利润-权益最大化者，并且最初假设他们可以仅通过发行债务来筹集资金以提高库存水平。我们表明，当需求的变异系数（CV）低时，股东对不同类型的经理人会保持漠不关心。但是，当需求的CV高时，情况并非如此。根据需求和公司的特定特征（例如获利能力，杠杆和破产成本），如果经理的薪酬待遇与公司价值（而不是权益价值）挂钩，那么股东可能会更好。然后，我们通过允许经理通过发行债务和股权筹集所需资金来扩展我们的模型。在这种情况下，我们专注于股票和公司价值最大化管理者，并表明我们的早期结果（仅针对债务案例）仍受发行股票成本的约束。但是，与经理人只能发行债券的情况相比，在这种情况下，公司价值最大化经理人对股东权益最大化经理人的收益要少得多。董事会在制定/修改适合管理人员的激励方案时可以考虑这些因素。我们还结合了非对称信息的概念，以捕捉其对董事会关于经理人激励计划的决策的影响。 [提交：2010年6月13日。修订日期：2010年11月29日； 2011年6月15日。接受：2011年8月16日。]

著录项

  • 来源
    《Decision Sciences》 |2012年第3期|p.395-436|共42页
  • 作者

    Oded Berman; Nima Sanajian; Hossein Abouee-Mehrizi;

  • 作者单位

    Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, 105 St. George Street, Toronto M5S 3E6, Canada;

    Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, 105 St. George Street, Toronto M5S 3E6, Canada;

    Department of Management Sciences, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West,Waterloo N2L 3G1, Canada;

  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    capital structure; manager's incentives; and newsvendor;

    机译：资本结构;经理的激励措施;和报摊;

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号