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The Bounded Rationality Bias in Managerial Valuation of Real Options: Theory and Evidence from IT Projects

机译：实物期权的管理估价中的有限理性偏向：IT项目的理论和证据

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摘要

Although real options theory normatively suggests that managers should associate real options with project value, little field research has been conducted to test whether they suffer from systematic biases in doing so. We draw on the notion of bounded rationality in managerial decision making to explore this understudied phenomenon. Using data collected from managers in 88 firms, we show that managers exhibit what we label the bounded rationality bias in their assessments: They associate real options with value only when a project's easily quantifiable benefits are low, but fail to do so when they are high. The study also contributes the first set of empirical measures for all six types of real options. The study contributes to managerial practice by identifying the conditions under which managers must be vigilant about inadvertently neglecting real options and by providing a simple approach for assessing real options in technology development projects.
机译：尽管实物期权理论从规范上建议经理应将实物期权与项目价值相关联，但很少进行现场研究来测试他们是否遭受系统性偏见。我们在管理决策中借鉴有限理性的概念来探索这种被忽视的现象。使用从88家公司的经理那里收集的数据，我们可以看出经理在评估中表现出了我们标记的有限理性偏见：只有当项目的易于量化收益较低时，他们才将实物期权与价值相关联，而当项目的收益高时，他们才这样做。 。该研究还为所有六种类型的实物期权提供了第一套实证指标。该研究通过确定经理必须警惕无意忽视实际选择的条件以及提供一种评估技术开发项目中实际选择的简单方法，为管理实践做出了贡献。

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