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Relevance versus reliability of accounting information with unlimited and limited commitment

机译：具有无限和有限承诺的会计信息的相关性与可靠性

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We consider a two-period LEN-type agency problem. The principal needs to implement one out of two accounting systems. One emphasizes relevance, the other reliability. Both systems produce identical inter-temporally correlated signals. The relevant system reports an accounting signal in the period in which it is produced. The reliable system reports a more precise signal, but with a one period delay. Accounting information is contractible only if it is reported within the two-period horizon of the game. Accordingly, accounting information produced in the second period becomes un contractible with the reliable system in place. Non-accounting information needs to be used for contracting to provide any second period incentives at all. We derive optimal compensation contracts in a full and in a limited commitment setting. With full commitment, the reliable system trades-off more precise first and less precise second-period contractible information, as compared to the relevant system. If the reduction of noise in the accounting signals is strong and the distortion in the non-accounting measure is weak, the reliable system is preferred. With limited commitment we identify a similar trade-off if intertemporal correlation of the signals is negative. If it is positive, this trade-off might reverse: The reliable system is possibly preferred if noise reduction is small and the non-accounting measure is heavily distorted. Noisiness in performance measures then serves as a commitment device. It reduces otherwise overly high powered incentives and thus benefits the principal.
机译：我们考虑一个两期的LEN型代理问题。委托人需要实施两种会计系统中的一种。一个强调相关性，另一个强调可靠性。两种系统都产生相同的时间相关信号。相关系统会在产生期间报告一个会计信号。可靠的系统报告更精确的信号，但有一个周期的延迟。仅当在游戏的两个时段内报告会计信息时，会计信息才是可收缩的。因此，在第二期间产生的会计信息变得难以用适当的可靠系统收缩。需要将非会计信息用于签约，以提供所有第二期激励措施。我们以完全和有限的承诺设置来得出最佳补偿合同。充分承诺，与相关系统相比，可靠的系统会在更精确的第一和第二阶段的可收缩信息之间进行权衡。如果核算信号中的噪声减少很强并且非核算措施中的失真较弱，则首选可靠的系统。如果信号的时间相关性为负，则在承诺有限的情况下，我们将确定相似的权衡。如果为正，则这种折衷可能会逆转：如果降噪幅度较小且非会计措施严重失真，则可能会首选可靠的系统。然后，绩效考核中的噪音会作为承诺手段。它减少了原本过高的动力激励，从而使本金受益。

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