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Reward and Punishment Mechanisms of the Flexible Retirement System in China

机译:中国弹性退休制度的奖惩机制

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This article attempts to understand the reward and punishment mechanisms of the flexible retirement system in China. The life-cycle model is applied in the pay-as-you-go pension system with flexible retirement policy to establish the numerical model of optimal retirement age under the consideration of prolonged life span. The effect of penalty rate for early retirement and incentive rate for delayed retirement on optimal retirement age is studied. Numerical experiments show that appropriate delayed retirement incentive rate incentivises a delayed retirement decision for maximising the total lifetime utility. The optimal retirement age is raised by prolonging lifespan, and the flexible retirement system is an effective means to implement delayed retirement policy.
机译:本文试图了解中国弹性退休制度的奖惩机制。将生命周期模型应用于具有灵活退休政策的随用随付养老金系统,以考虑延长寿命的情况建立最佳退休年龄的数值模型。研究了提前退休罚金率和延迟退休激励率对最优退休年龄的影响。数值实验表明,适当的延迟退休激励率可以使延迟退休决策最大化总寿命效用。延长寿命可以提高最佳退休年龄,灵活的退休制度是实施延迟退休政策的有效手段。

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