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EPR system based on a reward and punishment mechanism: Producer-led product recycling channels

机译:EPR系统基于奖励和惩罚机制:生产者 - LED产品回收渠道

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摘要

The discussion level of green development is constantly and exponentially growing, and the extended producer responsibility (EPR) system has become an important choice for the sustainable development of enterprises. To effectively manage the recycling of waste goods, this study uses the evolutionary game model to analyse the effectiveness of the reward and punishment mechanism for the implementation of the EPR system and builds a producer-led reverse closed-loop supply chain model under effective conditions. Then, we compare and analyse the channel selection of producers in carrying out the reverse supply chain under the different mechanisms of rewards and punishments. The findings are as follows. (1) The choice of producers regarding the implementation of the EPR system is affected by the reward and punishment mechanism. (2) Through the comparison of different models of recycling channels, it is found that producer-led independent recycling channels have the highest efficiency. (3) The producer will choose either the entrusted distributor recycling channels or entrusted third-party recycling channels, according to the different rewards and punishments.
机译:绿色发展的讨论水平不断呈现,扩大生产者责任(EPR)系统已成为企业可持续发展的重要选择。为了有效地管理废料的回收,本研究利用进化博弈模型分析了eps系统实施奖励和惩罚机制的有效性,并在有效条件下建立了生产者LED逆闭环供应链模型。然后,我们比较并分析生产者在奖励和惩罚机制下执行反向供应链的渠道选择。调查结果如下。 (1)关于EPR系统实施的生产者的选择受奖励和惩罚机制的影响。 (2)通过比较不同型号的回收通道,发现生产者的独立回收通道具有最高效率。 (3)根据不同的奖励和惩罚,生产者将选择委托经销商回收渠道或委托的第三方回收渠道。

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