The conception of an unshakeable moral world order under the Providence of the Almighty was the cornerstone of the 18th-century worldview. The major European churches, the pietistic movements and Enlightenment religiosity all agreed on this notion. In De l’Esprit des lois (1748), Montesquieu argues that all laws should be built on the inherent condition of existence, that is, the justice and righteousness of the world order. According to Montesquieu, it was impossible that God should violate this eternal norm of justice (Livre I: 1–2, see also Cassirer 1968, 234–243). This optimistic belief in a moral world order, where rewards and punishments were logical, withered away at the middle of the century and particularly in the aftermath of the Lisbon earthquake of 1755. The problem of evil and suffering and the philosophical problem of theodicy emerged as issues of concern. Why did suffering afflict people unjustly and indiscriminately? If God had created everything, where did evil spring from? The topicality of such questions in the 18th century is also due to the fact that the Devil as the explanation of evil was rejected as superstition, and the conception of original sin as absurd (Kelly 2002, 125; Cassirer 1968, 129–160; Saine 1997, 34, 88 f.; Scribner 1993, 478–480).
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机译：在全能者的天意下不可动摇的道德世界秩序的概念是18世纪世界观的基石。欧洲主要教会，虔诚运动和启蒙运动的宗教信仰都同意这一观点。孟德斯鸠在《 De l'Esprit des lois》（1748年）中指出，所有法律都应建立在存在的固有条件上，即世界秩序的正义和正义。根据孟德斯鸠的说法，上帝不可能违反这一永恒的正义准则（里弗尔一：1-2，另见卡西尔1968，234-243）。这种对道德世界秩序的乐观信念，使奖励和惩罚合乎逻辑，在本世纪中叶，特别是在1755年里斯本地震之后，逐渐消失了。邪恶和苦难问题以及神学的哲学问题随即出现。关注的问题。为什么苦难会不公正地滥杀无辜？如果上帝创造了一切，那么邪恶从何而来？在18世纪，此类问题的话题性还归因于以下事实：作为对邪恶的解释的魔鬼被认为是迷信，而原罪的概念被认为是荒谬的（凯利（Kelly）2002，125;卡西尔（Cassirer）1968，129-160;塞恩（Saine） 1997，34，88 f .; Scribner 1993，478-480）。
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