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首页> 外文期刊>Management Science and Engineering >ASYMMETRY INFORMATION PROBLEM OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION IN A NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: THE CASE OF GHANA NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE
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ASYMMETRY INFORMATION PROBLEM OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION IN A NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: THE CASE OF GHANA NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE

机译：信息不对称问题的道德风险和逆向选择在一个国家的医疗保险：加纳国家医疗保险案例

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Due to special properties of moral hazard and adverse selection in health insurance contract, governments’ effort to efficiently provide health care services to their citizens tends to encounter many problems, especially in low income countries. The National Health Insurance of Ghana has not been immune to this problem. This paper, explores empirical research to test for the asymmetric information problem of moral hazard and adverse selection in health insurance contracts. It uses both quantitative and qualitative to analyze data gathered through a meaningfully administered questionnaire in the Sekyere West District of Ghana to make its conclusion on the subject matter. Keywords: National Health Insurance; Moral Hazard; Healthcare; Adverse Selection; Asymmetry Information
机译：由于道德风险的特殊性质和健康保险合同中的逆向选择，政府为向其公民有效提供医疗服务的努力往往会遇到许多问题，尤其是在低收入国家。加纳的国家健康保险未能幸免于此。本文探索了实证研究，以检验健康保险合同中道德风险和逆向选择的不对称信息问题。它使用定量和定性分析在加纳的Sekyere西区通过有意义管理的问卷收集的数据，以得出有关该主题的结论。关键词：国民健康保险;道德风险;卫生保健;逆向选择;不对称信息

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