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Do Depositors Discipline Banks in Nigeria?

机译：存款人在尼日利亚从事银行业务吗？

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Market discipline, particularly from depositor’s perspective, is believed to have the incentive for curbing excessive appetite for risk by banks, particularly if the information on discipline devices is to the knowledge of bank managers. Adopting a generalised method of moments closely related to that of Blundell and Bond (1998), the study investigates the concept of market discipline in Nigeria using quarterly micro-data from 2007Q1 to 2016Q4 across twenty four (24) banks. Typifying banks and deposits, the study finds evidence in support of market discipline for smaller and domestically-controlled banks, in terms of deposit reallocation, with foreign currency account holders as most active. The big and foreign-owned banks however pay higher deposit rate as compensation. In other words, there is the presence of the concept of too-big-to-fail and too-good-to-fail. The study advocates for increase in the dissemination of banks information to the Nigerian public, so as to enable depositors take proactive deposit decisions. It further recognises the need for Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to toughen her supervisory role by adequately and openly sanctioning banks that violate regulatory provisions. This will not only serve as deterrent to others that might intend similar violations, but provide information about erring banks to depositors who will process and use them as discipline device.
机译：市场纪律，特别是从储户的角度出发，被认为有抑制银行过度冒险的动机，特别是如果纪律手段的信息是银行经理所知的话。该研究采用与Blundell和Bond（1998）密切相关的广义矩法，使用2007年第一季度至2016年第四季度的季度微观数据，调查了二十四（24）家银行的尼日利亚市场纪律概念。该研究是银行和存款的典型代表，在存款再分配方面，以外汇账户持有人最为活跃的方式，发现了证据支持小型和国内控股银行的市场纪律。但是大型和外资银行支付较高的存款利率作为补偿。换句话说，存在“太大而不能失败”和“太好而不能失败”的概念。该研究主张增加向尼日利亚公众的银行信息传播，以使存款人能够主动做出存款决定。它还进一步认识到尼日利亚中央银行（CBN）有必要通过适当和公开地制裁违反监管规定的银行来加强其监督作用。这不仅可以威慑其他可能犯下类似违规行为的人，而且可以向将要处理它们并将其用作纪律手段的储户提供有关错误存入银行的信息。

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