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Top Management Change, Succession Source and Enterprise Risk Decision Tendencies

机译：最高管理者变更，继任来源和企业风险决策趋势

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Based on Anomie theory and actual revenue management theory, this paper explores the relationship between R&D investment and short-term investment after administrative change/mandatory change. It is found that administrative change/mandatory change can significantly reduce R&D investment, and executive change can be significantly changed. Increasing short-term investments and mandatory changes in executives can significantly increase short-term investments. In addition, mandatory changes in executives can significantly reduce a company’s R&D investment. Successful sources can mitigate this relationship between administrative changes/mandatory changes and corporate R&D investments, and short-term investments in companies with executive change/mandatory changes. External successors will weaken changes/mandatory changes to R&D investments, while internal successors will enhance the impact of change/mandatory changes on R&D investment. At the same time, external successors will reduce the positive impact of change/mandatory changes on short-term investments, and internal successors will enhance the positive impact of change/mandatory changes on short-term investments.
机译：本文基于Anomie理论和实际收益管理理论，探讨了行政变更/强制变更后R＆D投资与短期投资之间的关系。研究发现，行政变更/强制性变更可以大大减少研发投入，而行政变更可以被大幅变更。短期投资的增加和高管的强制性变更可以大大增加短期投资。此外，高管人员的强制性变动可以大大减少公司的研发投资。成功的资源可以减轻行政变更/强制性变更与企业R＆D投资之间的关系，以及对具有行政变更/强制性变更的公司进行短期投资之间的关系。外部继任者将削弱研发投资的变更/强制性变更，而内部继任者将增强变更/强制性变更对R＆D投资的影响。同时，外部继任者将减少变更/强制性变更对短期投资的积极影响，而内部继任者将增强变更/强制性变更对短期投资的积极影响。

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