本文研究CEO 变更前后公司盈余管理程度的变化，发现我国上市公司在CEO变更当年进行显著的负向盈余管理，调低利润；在变更次年进行正向盈余管理，调高利润，并进而恢复到变更前一年的水平；其中外部继任在继任当年的负向盈余管理程度更大，而在继任次年的正向盈余管理程度更大；并且来自大股东的外部继任与内部继任企业之间的盈余管理政策类似，但来自经理人市场的外部继任与内部继任企业之间的盈余管理政策有明显差异。%This paper examines earnings management behavior of the listed A-Stock firms in Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period of CEO turnover .We find:(1)Earnings management exists during the year of CEO turnover and next year , and the firms of CEO turnover usually reduce profits through earnings management in the year of turnover , and then increase profit to meet the level of the previous year .(2)Compared to inside successors, outside successors make more negative earn-ings management in the year of turnover , while inside successors make more positive earnings management in the next year . (3) The policy of earnings management is similar between successors from major shareholders and from firm inside .However, the policy of earnings management is different between successors from manager market and from firm inside .
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