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Re-thinking the active-passive distinction in attention from a philosophical viewpoint

机译：从哲学的角度重新思考注意力的主动-被动区别

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Whether active and passive, top-down and bottom-up, or endogenous and exogenous, attention is typically divided into two types. To show the relationship between attention and other functions (sleep, memory, learning), one needs to show whether the type of attention in question is of the active or passive variety. However, the division between active and passive is not sharp in any area of consciousness research. In phenomenology, the experience of voluntariness is taken to indicate activity, but this experience is often confused with others. In psychology, task-dependent behavior is taken to indicate activity, but is often conflated with complex automatic behavior. In neuroscience, top-down processes are taken to exclusively indicate activity despite the fact that both top-down and bottom-up activations are always present in the brain. Moreover, work in attention has shown that the results of so-called passive and active processes are sometimes inseparable. Carrasco, et al. (2004), for example, show that active attention results in the same change in perceptual contrast that is enacted by bottom-up mechanisms. Likewise, Reynolds and Desimone (2003) show that top-down and bottom-up attention effect neural contrast in the same way. Thus, the passive-active distinction does not seem to neatly separate two types of attention. Perhaps a more convincing model of attention combines active and passive processing into a single mechanism of control. One such potential model is what we call the Unitary Saliency Map Model, first suggested by Koch and Ullman (1985) and developed by Treue (2003). In such a model, top-down and bottom-up processes each feed into the same saliency map, from which attention is controlled. We argue that this makes sense of the phenomenological, psychological, and neuroscientific data. Finally, the acceptance of such a model will force us to review some of our previous findings on attention and its relation to consciousness.
机译：无论是主动和被动，自上而下和自下而上，还是内生和外生，注意力通常分为两种。为了显示注意力与其他功能（睡眠，记忆，学习）之间的关系，需要显示所关注的注意力是主动还是被动。但是，在意识研究的任何领域，主动和被动之间的区分都不是很明显。在现象学中，自愿经验是用来表示活动的，但是这种经验通常会与他人混淆。在心理学中，任务相关行为被认为是活动，但通常与复杂的自动行为混为一谈。在神经科学中，尽管自上而下和自下而上的激活始终存在于大脑中，但自上而下的过程被认为专门指示活动。此外，关注的工作表明，有时所谓的被动和主动过程的结果是不可分割的。卡拉斯科等人。 （2004年），例如，表明主动注意导致自下而上的机制所造成的知觉对比的相同变化。同样，Reynolds和Desimone（2003）表明，自上而下和自下而上的注意力以相同的方式影响神经对比度。因此，被动-主动区分似乎并不能将两种注意力集中在一起。也许更令人信服的注意模型将主动和被动处理结合到单个控制机制中。这样的潜在模型就是我们所说的单一显着性图模型，该模型首先由Koch和Ullman（1985）提出，然后由Treue（2003）开发。在这样的模型中，自上而下和自下而上的过程都输入到相同的显着图中，从中可以控制注意力。我们认为，这对现象学，心理和神经科学数据是有意义的。最后，这种模型的接受将迫使我们回顾我们先前关于注意力及其与意识的关系的一些发现。

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